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" 0We denounce arbitrary interference by Federal au-
thorities in local affairs as a violation of the constitu4,.
of the United States, and a crime against free institutions,
and we especially object to government by injunction as a
new and higi.ly dahgerous form of oppression by which federal
judges, in contempt of the laws of the States and rights of
citizens become at once legislators, judges and executioners'.
Such was the languiage of the platform of the democra-
tic party, adopted at Chicago, July 9, 1896. It gave to
the wokld a new phrase, 'Government by Injunction'/ As
generally accepted and understood the expression applies
particularly to the use of the injunction as a means of
settling the labor troubles known as strikes and boycotts,-
the eruptions of the industrial world, caused by the eternal
struggle between capital and labor.
We are told that once upon a time the plebians of
ancient Pome becoming dissatisfied with the oppressive con-
duct of the patricians, seceded in a body to the sacred
mount, declaring that they would not remain a part of the
body politic unless the patricians made certain concessions
to them. At this juncture Menenius Aggrippa addressed the
pleb"ans as follows:- " Once upon a time, the other members
of the body conspired against the stomach; they declared
they had all the work to do, while the stomach lay quietly
in the middle of the body and enjoyed, without any labor,
everything theybrought it. So they all quit work, and de-
termined to starve the stomach into submission. But soon
they discovered* thatwhile they,were starving the stomach,
they too, were being starved, and that the whole body was
wasting away." The social aspect of the question presented
by this little fable, we do not intend to discuss, but we
will confine this thesis to a treatment of the subject from
a purely legal standpoint.
We can describe the general opinion of the public on
the question in no better, manner than by the following lan-
guage of Walter Murphy (1894 Utah Bar Ass'n.) He says:-
If by a poe/tic license we should personify the ancient
and honorable writ of injunction, and inagine it as lapsing
into a state of unconsciousnessri so to speak, say half a cen-
tury ago, and a's now waking up, like Rip Van Winkle after
his twenty years of slumber, and scrutinizing its present
condition as reflected in certain contemporary ideas of some
vogue, it seems certain that it would be as much bewilderedb
by some aspects of its present self as was Irving's legen-
dary Dutchman. Unlike the latter, however, it would per-
ceive in itself no trace of the rheumatics; but on the con-
trary would find itself endowed with divers athletic, not
to say acrobatic capabilities of which, in its earlier age,
it had not dreamed! If Mr. Murphy had carried the figure
a little further he would have come nearer the true situa-
tion. It is related that "it was some time before he (Rip)
could get into the regular track of xftaixx gossip, or could
comprehend
be made to xxIxx±K the strange events that had taken
place during his torpor" However, he finally "got on" and
having fresumed his old walks and habits; he soon found many
of his forme cronies, though all rather the worse fot the
3/
wear and tear of time; and preferred making friends amongkk
the rising generatio n, with whom he soon grew into great
favor'.'
The whole legal controversy ma,; be tersely stated in
the words of Ashujrst, J , in Pasley V Freeman, 3 D. & E.
P 63. He says, "Another argument which has been made use
of is, that this is a new case, and that t4here is no prece-
dent for such an action. Where cases are new in their
principle there I admit that it is necessary to have re-
course to legislative interposition in order to remedy the
greviance: but where the case is only new in the instance,
.ALTD T}i- OLY QUESTIO% IS UP0U THE APPLICATION of a principle
recognized in the law to such new case, it will be just as
competent to courts of juStice to apply the principle to any
which may arise two centuries hence as it was two centuries
ago: If it were not, we ought to blot out of our law books
one fourth part of the cases that are to be found in them
Is Government by Injunction new iii the Principle or only in
the instance? If new in the principle it is unjustifiable,
If only new in the instance it is justifiable, as 'it is the
function of the courts to apply established principles to kk
the changing circumstances and conditions of h',uman life"
The general objection is always interposed in these
cases that "it is not one of the functions of a court of
equity to prevent the commission of threatened crimes.' It
seems that in early times "the Lord Chancellor assumed juris
diction in some cases upon the ground that the defendant's
power was such that he could not or would not be punished by
4.
a court of law for committing a threatened offense" But
this paactice has long been obsolete. 1 Spence, 343-345,
684 et seq. (See The Mayor V. Jacques, 30 Ga. 506, 513.)
In Gee V. Pritchard, 2 Swanston, 402, 413, Lord Eldon said:
"The publication of a libel is a crime, and I have no juris
diction to prevent the commission of a crime" bUT W1HVLE -
THIS IS TRUE IT IS EQUALLY AS TRUE THAT $T}HE MERN FACT THAT
an act is criminal does not divest the "xxk jurisdiction of
equity to prevent it by injunction, if it be also a viola-
tion of property rights, and the party aggreived has no
other adequate remedy for the prevention of the irreparable
injury which will result from the failure or inability of a
court of law to redress such right" Mobile V. Ry Co.,
•84 Ala., 115, 126. Peoples gas Co. V. Tyner,131 Ind. 277.
Minke V. Hopeman, 87 Ill. 451. Crawford V. Tyrrell, 128
N. Y. 341. Shoe Co. V. Saxey, 131 Mo. 212. In the last
case at page 220 the court says,"It will be observed that
the defendants do not claim the right to do what the injunc-
tion forbids them doing; .their learned counsel ever quotes ik
the statute to show that it is a crime to do so; but he con-
tends that ithe constitution of the United States and the
constitution of the State of Mosouri guarantee them the
right to committ crime with only ithis limitation, to wit:
that they shall answer for the crime when committed, in a
criminal court before a jury; and that to restrain them from
committing crime is to rob them of their cbnbtitutional
right of trial by jury.
5.
"If that position be correct, then there can be no
valid statute to prevent crime. But that position is con-
trary to all reason. The right of trial by jury does not
arise until the party is accused of having already committed
the crime. If you see a man advancing upon another with
murderous demeanor and a deadly weapon, and you arrest him,
disarm him, you) have iperhaps prevented an act which would
have brought about a trial by jury, but can you, be said to
have deprived him of hhe constitutional right of trial by
jury? The train of thought put in motion by the argument
of the learned counsel for the p±xa~idft defendants on this
point leads only to this end, to wit, that the constitution
guarantees to every man the right to commit crime so that he
may enjoy fhe inestimable right of trial by jury. # # #
When we say that a court of equity will never intefere by
injunction to prevent the commission of a crime, we mean t1
that it will not do so simply for the purpose of preventing
a violation of a criminal law. But when the act complain-
the
ed of threatens an irreparable injury to"property of an in-
dividual, a court of equity will interfere to prevent that
injury, notwithstanding the act may also be a violation of
a criminal law. In such case the court does not interfere
to prevent the commission of a crime although that may in-
cidentally result, but it exerts its force to protect the
individuals property from destruction, and ignores entirely
the criminal portio- of the act.'
In Carlton V. Rugg, 149 Mass. 550,553, it is said,
"The fallacy of the argument lies in part in disregarding
"t E is~'" i a _34e --_ E ,_b44 ;Q
the distinction between a 'proceeding to abate a nuisance,
which looks only to the property, that in the use made of it
constitutes a nuisance, and a proceeding to :punish an offend.
er for the crime of maintaining a nuisance. These two
proceedings are antirely unlike. The latter is conducted
under the provisions of the criminal law, and deals only
with the person who has violated the law. The former is
governed by the rules which relate to property, and its only
connection with persons is through property in which they
may be interested"
17.
Labor troubles seem to divide naturally into two classes:)
strikes and boycotts. 7e will first deal with the use of
the injunction in strike cases. The definitions of a
strike range from "a cessation of work, as of workmen, in
order to extort higher wages? (Worcester) to the elaborate
tirade of JUdge Jenkins in Farmer's &c. Co. V. Northern Pac.
Ry. Co., 60 Fed. 803, pp. 818-822. He says, "It has well
been said that the wit of man could not devise a legal
strike, because compulsion is the leading idea of it. A
strike is essentially A constiracy to extort by violence; t-
be
the means employed to effect the end kxxing riot only the
cessation of labor by the x, m±:krxx conspirators, but the
necessary prevention of labor by those willing to assume
th eir places, and, as a last resort, and in many instances
an essential element of success, the disabling and destruc-
tion of the property of the master; and so, by intimidation
and by the compulsion of force, to accomplish the end design
ed. I know of k peaceable sttike. I think no strike
was ever heard of that was or could be successful unaccom-
panied by intimidation and violente" "Of the ideal strike
the only criticism to be indulged is that it is ideal,
and never existed in fact! Notwithstanding JUdge Jenkins
it is well settled "that strikes are not necessarily illegal
Arthur V. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310, 327. Master Stevedore's
Ass'n. V. Walsh, 2 dalyl. Lnngshore Printing Co. V. How-
ell, 26 Ore.? 527. "We are not perpared"I said JUdge
Harlan in A-thur V. OaRes, "in the absence of evidence, to
hold, as matter of law, that a combihation among employes,
having for its object their orderly withdrawal in large num-
8.
bers, or in a body from the service of their employers, on
account simply of a rediction in *heir wages, is not a xtrx
strike, within the meaning of the word a. commonlV used.
Such a withdrawal although amounting to a strike, is pot, as
we have already said, either illegal or criminal"
The "legality or illegality of a strike "must depend
on the means byi which it is enforced, and on its objects"
This brings us to the first question. Suppose a
strike to be illegal, can the body of men be enjoined from 4
striking? In Farmer's &c. Co. V. Ry. Co., supra, the em-
ployes of the railroad were enjoined "from (1) combining and
conspiring to quit, with or without notice, the service of
said receivers,5with the object and intent of crippling the
property in their custody, or ambarras the operation of sai&
railroad, and (2) from so quitting the service of the said
receivers, withs xmk$HEtxacxxtmim nfxzxxi±±!x±NX~kxxxx
lxrzpux~ or without notice, as to cripple the property, or
prevent or hinder the operation of said railroad!. On the
second point the court said, ( p. 812) "None will dispuie
the general proposition of the right (f every one to choose
his employer, andi to determine the times and conditions of
service, or his right to abandon such service,- to use the
expressio", of Judge Pardee in Re Higgins, (27 Fed., 4$3)7-
'peacebly and decently'-but it does not follow that one has
the absolute right to abandon a service which he has under-
taken, without regard to time and conditions. It is ab-
surd to say that one may do ache will withoiit respect to the
rights of others. Liberty and license must not be con-
founded. Liberty is not the exercise of unbridled will,
but consists in freedom of action, having due regard to the
some
rights of others. There would seem to exist in :kk minds
a lamentable misapprehension of the terms 'liberty' and
'right! It would seem by some to be supposed that in this
land one has the constitutional right to do as one may pleae
and that any restraint iupon the will is an infringement xpz
upon freedon of action. Rights are not absolute, but are
relative. Rights grow out of duty9 and are limited by
duty. One has not the right arbitrarily to quit service
without regard to the necessities of that service. His
right of abandonment is limited by the assiihption of that
service, and the conditions and exigencies attaching thereto,
. It cannot be conceded that an individual has the
legal right to abandon service whenever he may please. His
right to leave is dependant upon duty7, and his duty is dic-
tated and measured by theexigencyJ of the occassion....
It is said that to -estrain them from so doing is abridge-
ment of liberty and infringement of constitutional right. I
do not so apprehend the law. I freely concede the right of
the individual to abandon service at a proper time, and in a
decent m;inner;, but I do not concede their right to abandon
such service suddenly and without reasonable notice"
On appeal (rthur V. Oakes) the injunction was modi-
fied by striking out the second clause, Judge Harlan saying,
"The vital question remains whether a court of equity will
under any circumstances, by injunction, prevent one individ-
personal
ual from q+itting the"service of another? . The rulq
10.
we think, is without exception that equity will 'iot compdl
the actual, affirmative performance by an employe of merely
personal services, any more than it will compel an employer
to -etain in his personal service one who, no matter for
what cause, is not acceptable to him for service of that
characte,-. The right of an employe engaged to perform
personal servibce to quit that service rests upon the same
basis as the right of his emplojer to discharge him from
personal service. If the quitting in the one case or the
discharging in the other is in violation of the contract be-
tween the parties, the one injured by the breach has his
action for damages; and a court of equity, indire-ctl' or
negatively, by means of 1n injulctton, restraining the
violation of the contvact, compel the affirmative perform-
ance from day to day or the affirmative acceptance of merely
personal services. Relief of that character has always
been regarded as impracticable. Toledo &c. Fy. Co. V.
Penn. Co., 54 Fed., 740 Taft? J.? and authorities cited;
Fr, ppec. Perf. (3d Am. Ed.) secs. 87-81, and authorities
cited. ... The fact that employes of railroads may
quit under circumstances that would show bad faith upon
their part, or a reckless disregard of their contractx or of
the convenience and interests of the public, does not jus-
tify a departure from the general rule that equity will not
compel the actual, affirmative performance of merely person-
al services, or (which is the same thing) require employes,
against their will, to remain in the personal service of
their employerV
11.
It is now settled that employes have a right to quit
"whenever thej may see fit to do so, and no one can pceventh
them" Shoe Co. V. Saxey, supra. Cook V. Dolan, 6 dist.
(Pa.) 324. U. S. V. Debs, 64 Fed. p. 763.
But it has been held that "so long as they (employes)
remain in the einployment of the complainant company" the
court will compal then"to~prform all their regular and
accustomed dlties" where "such refusal (to perform duties)
subjects and w~ll continue to subject the complainant to a
multiplicity ,of suits and to great and irreparable damage'
So. Cal. Ry. Co. V. Putherford, 62 Fed. 796. See
(dicta) Chicago &c. Ry. Co, V. Bur1ington &c. Ry. Co., 34
Fed/, 481 ,483. In Re Lennon , 54 Fed. 746; 150 U. S.J393;
4 Fed. 320; 166 U. S. 548. "But since the company has
the, power of discharge, equity would not interfere b-1 injunc-
tion, except in a clear case of special necessity.' (34 Fed)
On the first proposition of the portion of the in-
junation quoted fron Farmer's &c. Co/V. Ry. Co., Judge
Harlan, in Arthur V. Oakes, said: "But different considera-
tions must control infrespect to the words in the same par-
agraph of the writs of injunction, 'and from snrbinng and
conspiring to quit, with or without notice, the service of
said receivers,,with the object and intent of crippling the
property in their custody, or embarrassing the operation of
said railroad';.. . We have said that if employes were unwill-
ing to remain in the service of the receivers for the com-
pensation prescribed for them by the railroad schedules, it
was the right of eachlone oA that account to withdraw from'
such s!.rvice. It wa.; equally their right without refer-
12.
ence to the effect upon the property or upon +he operation
of the xz±±road, to confer with each other upon the subject
of the proposed reducation in wages, and withdraw in a body
from 'he services of the receivers because of the proposed
change. Indeed, their right, as a body of employes af-
fected by the proposed reduction of wages, to demand given
rates of compensation as a condition of their remaining in b
the service, was as absolute and perfect as was the right of
the receivers representing the aggregation of persons, cre-
ditors and stockholders, interested in the trust property,
and the general public, to fix the rates they were willing
to cray their respective employes. But that is a very
different matter from a combination and conspiracy among
employes, with the object and intent, not simply of quitting
the service of the receivers because of the reduction of
wages, but of crippling the pro~perty in their hands, and
rail
embarrassin the qperation of the"road. When the order for
the original injunction was applied for it was represented-
and the interveners admit by their motion that it was cor-
rectly represented- that unless the restraining power of
the court was exerted the dissatisfied employees, and others
co-operating with them, would physically disable and render
unfit for xxxxKH use the cars and other property of the
receivers, and by force, threats and intimidation used ag-
ainst employes remaining in their service, and against those
desiring to take the .lace of those quitting, would prevent
the receivers from operating the road in their custody, and
and from discharging the duties which they owed on behalf of
13.
the corporation to the parties inte,'ested, in the trust
propeety, to the government and to the public.
"The general inhibition against combinations and con-
spiracies formed with the object and in4 ent of crippling the
property and embarrassing the operation of the railroad must
be construed as referring only to acts of violence, intini-
dation and wrong of the same nature or class as those spe-
cifically described in the previous clauses (of) the writ.
We do not interpret the words last above quoted as embracing
the case of akK employes who, being dissatisfied with the
proposed reduction of wages, merely withdraw on that account
singly or by concerted action, from the service of the re-
ceivers, using neither force, threats, persecution, nor in-
timidation towards employes who do not join them, norfny
device to molest, hinder, alarm, or interfere with others
who take or desire to take their places. ...
"Ireems entirel,1 clear, upon authority, that any com-
bination or conspiracy upon the part of these employes would
be illegal, which has for its object to cripple the property
in the hands of the receivers, and to embarrass the operati,
of the railroads under their management, either by disabling
or rendering unfit for use engines, cars, or other property
in their hands, or by interfering with their possession, or
by actually obstructing their control and management of the
property, or by using force, intimidation, threats, or other
wrongful methods against the receivers or their agents, or
against employes remaining in their service, or by ising
like methods to cause employes to quit or prevent or deter
14.
others from entering the service in place of those leaving
it/ Combinations of that character disturb the peace of
society, and are mischevious in the extrme. They imperil
the interests of the 1,ublic, which may rightfully, demand
that the free course of trade shall not be unreasonably ob-
structed. They endanger the personal security and the
personal liberty of individuals who, in the exercise of the
inalienable privelege of choosing the terms upon which they
shall labor, enter or attempt to enter the service of those
against whom combinations are specially aimed. And as
acts of the character referred to would have defeated a prop-
er administration of the trust estate, and inflicted irre-
parable inju;ry upon it, as well as prejudiced the rights of
the public, the circuitproperly framed its injunction so
as to restrain all such acts as are specifically mentioned,
as well as combinations and conspiracies havibg the object
and intent of physically injuring the property, or actually
interfering with the regular, continuous operation of the
railroad by the receivers"
This case was followed in Elder V. Whitsides, M2 Fed,
724. See Thomas V. Cincinatta &c. Ry. -o., 62 Fed. p/ 817
In U. S. V. Debs, 64 Fed., 724, 763, Judge Woods,
commenting on Arthur V. Oakes, said, "Neither expressly nor
by implication does the opinion there delivered lend the re-
motest sanction to the proposition asserted by one of the e-u
counsel for the defendants, that in free America every mah
has a right to abandon his position either for a good or a
bad reason, and that another, for a good or a bad reason,
15.
may advise or persuade him to do so. Manifestly this is
Uot true . ... The right of men to strike peaceably, and
the right to advise a peaceable strike, which the law does
not assume to be impossible, is not questioned. But if
men enter into a conspiracy to do an unlawfiil thing, and, in
order to accomplish their purpose, advise workmen to go upon
a strike, knowing that violence and wrong will be the pro-
bable outcome, neither in law nor in morals can they escape
responsibility'.'
If employes cannot be restrained from striking what
is the province of equity in case of a strike? The rule
is well stated in Cook V. Dolan?- "A court of equity has no
jurisdiction over the question which caused the strike.
It cannot stop the conflict; it can only see that the con-
flict which is being waged, is confined within what are re-
cognized as lawful limits. It were better there were no
strikes, and stilt better that there were no just cause for
them. But the cou-ts can neither stop the strikes nor en-
force the demands of the strikess. We can only say to the
parties to the controversy, thus far and no further can you
go without violating the rights of the public or the per-
sonal rights of individuals" What are lawful limits we
will now discuss.
It seems to be conce-eded that strikers "have a right
to use fair persuasion to induce others to join them in
their quitting or refrain from taking their places" Shoe
Co. V. Saxey. )vf Ry. Co. V. Wenger, 17 Wk. L. Bull.? 306.
Rogers V. Evarts, 17 N. Y. suppl. .
16.
But strikers have no right to stop new workmen,
against their will, while on their way to work, for the pur-
pose of arguing with them. O'Neil V. Behhnna, 182 Pa. St.
6 "It is frther urgedV says Justice Mitchell)t "that
the strikers through their committees only exercised ( 'iN-
sisted on' is the phrase their counsel use in court)t their
right to talk to the mew men, to persuade them not to go to
work. There was no such right. These men were there
presumably under contract with the plaintiff, and certainly
in search of work if not yet actu]ally under pay. They
4were not at leisilre, and their time, whether their own or
their employers, could not lawfully be taken up and their
progress interrupted With by +hese or any other outsiders on
any pretense or under any claim of right, to argue or per-
suade them to break their contracts. Even, therefore, i4f
if the arguments and persuasions had been confined to lawful
Mans, they were exerted at an improper time, and were an
interference with the plaintiffVs rights which made the per-
petrators liable for any damage the plaintiff suffered in
consequence"
"Bvt when fair persvasion is exhausted they have no
right to resort to force or threats of violence" "The law
will protect their freedom and their rights, but it will not
permit them tolestroy the freedom and rights of others. The
same law which guarantees the defendants in their rightx to
quit the employment of the plaintiffs at their own will and
pleasure also 1uarantees the otherx employes the right to
remain at their will and pleasure. Shoe Co. Vo. Saxey.
17.
The earliest case I have been able to find is Muller
V. cGrantz. (See, appendix.) In this case an ex patte
order was granted by Judge Donohue restraining the defendant
from using both Dpersuasions and threatz" against employes
and those who wished to become employes of the plaintiff.
On notion to contine Ihe injunction, Judge Barrett modified
the order by directing that it "be confined to intimidationa
The next case is Brusche V. The Furnitulre Maker's Union, 18
Chicago Legal News, 306. I quote the following from the
opinion of Judge Collirs, "The bill then alleges that com-
plainant refused to comply with these demands, and in conse-
quence of such refisalhave attempted and are now a"temting
in an unlawful manner to ri-le or ruin his business, and to
prevent., other workmen from being employed by him; that the
defendants threaten to blow up complainants factory with
dynamite; that 1hey sAand on the side walk of his factory
and on the side walks leading khximt to it, continuously
occupying it and making threa+s against him and his buisnesq
that they prevent by force workmen who wre employed and those
who desire employment from entering his factory; that they
have placed a guard over his factory and over the streets
leading to it, and that said streets are patrolled constant-
ly b' the defendants and others by their procurement for the
unlawful purpose of intimidating complainant's workmen and
thus preventing them from entering his factory, and such
workmen are subjected to personal violence and insult by
the defendants while going to and coming from their work at
18/
complainant's factory, and that the defendants threaten if
their demands are not complied with they will continue the
same system of annoyance and will continue to destroy com-
plainant's factory and all the stock and machinery therein!
. . . "An injunction was issued to restrain the defendants
from committing the acts complained of"
In McCandless V. O'Brien, 21 Pitts. L. J., 435, the
court said, "It must still be ujnderstood that plaintiff's
are here entitled to an injunction . . . because they (de-
fendants) have undertaken by woords and acts, by, their num-
bers, their manner, and their movements, not to persuade
workmen to look at the matter of working for plaintiffs as
they view it, and of their own free will cease; but *o
practically compel them by annoyance and intimidation to
leave plaintiffs employ or refuse employmeijt" It is now
well settled, following the doctrine of these early cases,
that an injunctior, will be granted restraining strikers from
using force, threats, intimidations arid coercion against
other persons who remain in the elployment of the complain-
ant or who seek employment from him. Davis V. Zimmermen,
91 Hun, 489. Coeur D'Alene &c. V. Miner's Union, 51 Fed.?
260. Murdock V. Walker, 152 Pa. ST.? 595. Wick China CO.
V. Brown, 164 Pa. St., 449. Mxrxay Steel Wire Co. V.
Murray, 80 Fed., 811. But where no force, violence,
intimidation or coercion is intended against such workmen
an injunction will be refused. Johnson Harvester Co.
V. Meinhardt, 9 Ab. N. C., 393, aff'd. 24 Hun, 489. Roge-s.
17 N. Y. Suppl.? 261, aff'd., sub. nomrRenolds V. Everett,
67 Hun, 294, and 144 N. Y.? 189.
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In Murdock V. Walker, an injunction was granted re-
straining defendants "from gathering at and about plaintiffs
place of 'business, and from following the workmen employed
by plaintiffs, or who may hereafter be so employed, to and
from their work, and gathering at and about the boarding
places of said workmen, and from any and all maner of threat
menaces, intimidationx, opprobrius epithets, ridicule and
anan to and against said workman or any of them them, f
for or on account of their working for plaintiffs." (See,
also, China Co. V. Brown and Cook V. DolaA.)
In Veglehan V. Guntner, 167 Mass., 92? the injunction
included "social pressure" used in connection with threats
and ti :Rkup:Ux intimidation and persuasion to break exist-
ing contracts. (See quotation from Cote V. Murphy, 159
Pa. St., -2 , on p. Y, I
In Sweeny V. Torrence, I Dist. (Pa.) 622, the injunc-
tion was refused because "all the acts complained of that
are distinct and particular occurred or were committed long
since . ... It seems that on behalf of these plaintiffs
this court is not asked to stop or prohibit the commission
or consumation of any present or threatening action by the
defendants, but to anticipate and prohibit by its injunctio4
some action that may possibly be taken in the future. When
such action is taken it will be time to interfere"
In Mayer V. Journeymen Stonecutters' Ass'n., 47 N. J.
Eq., 519, an injunction was denied because "nothing has been
proved in this case to warrant a findinghat the defendants
have done or threatened i that is not legalized by this
act of the legislature. (Act of 1883, Rev. Sup. p. 774,
sec. 30.) . . . They have agreed not to work with any
but members of their association, and not to work for any
employer who insists on their doing so, by withdrawing
from his employment. So long as they confine themselves
to peaceable means to affect these ends, they are within
the letter and spirit of the law, and not subject to the
interference of the courts.'
But what constitutes force, threats and intimidation?
In McCandless V. O'Brien the court said, "It still suffi-
ciently appears that the defendants . . were not satis-
fied with such means as left such workmen to choose freely
between working and refraining from work, but undertook to
so act as to make it unpleasant and apparently to some deg
gree unsafe for them to continue in plaintiff's employmHxkx,
and to embarrass them by preventing them from obtaining
suitable lodgingz or boarding places, and thus force those
who were desirous of working to quit plaintiff's employ.'
In 0'Neil V. Behanna it is said, "The strikers and their
counsel seem to think that the former could do anything to
attain their ends, short of actual, physical violence. This
is a most serious mistake. The 'arguments' and 'persua-
sions' and 'appeals' of a hostile and demonstrative mob have
a potency over men of ordinary nerve which far exceeds the
limits of lawfulness. The display of force though none is
actually used is intimidation, and as much unlawful as vio-
lence itself' In Mackall V. Ratchford, 82 Fed., 41,42,
he court said, "It seems from the evidence that but few of
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the miners employed at the Montana mines had joined the
strikers. All efforts to induce them to do so had appar-
ently failed. At this Jijncture a company of marching
strikers, mostly from Monongah7 went into camp about one
mile from the Montana mines. During Honday, Tuesday and
Wednesday, this company, under command of its offic-ers, with
music and banners, marched and nountermarched along the
county road running fhvmugh the property of the Montana Coal
& Coke Company. This marching was very early in the morn-
ing and in the afternoon, at times when the miners of said
company, were either going to or coming from their work.
The marching was. from thQ camp down to the mine opening,
then back to the village where the miners lived, thence
again past the mine openiag, and so on, 'To and fro', during
certain hours of the morning and afternoon.... A body
of men, over 200 strong, marching in the early hours of the
morning, before daylight, halting in front of the mine open-
ing, and taking position ofi each sideoft the public highway
for a distance of at least a quarter of a mile, at the exact
places where the miners were in the habit of crossing that
highway for the purpose of going from their homes to their
work, is at least unusual, and in the state of excitement
usuall: attending such occassions, neither an aid to fair
argument, no' conducive,,, to the state of mind that makes xtii
willing converts to the cause thus championed. That the
marching did intimidate quite a number of the miners is
clear, if the evidence offered is to be believed; and the
court finds it uncontradicted and entitled to credence.
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The court is also forced to conclude, from the facts and
circuimstance detailed by the witnesses, from the object the
marching men had in view, and from the locality where they
marched, and its topography, that the intention of the march.
ing strikers was to interfere with the operation of the
Montana mines,-with the miners engaged in working said mine§
to intimidate them, and tlereby induce them to abandon their
work, and then secure their co-operation in closing the
mines. The marching men seemed to think that they could
go and come on and over the county road as they pleased, be-
cuase it was a public highway. But this was a mistake.
The miners working at Montana had the same right to use the
r ublic road as the strikers had, and it was not open and
free to their use when it was occupied by over 200 men
stationed along it at intervals of three or five feet,-
men who, if not open enemies, were not bosom friends. That
some miners passed through this line is shown. That uik
others feared to do so is plain. That the marching col-
umn intended to interfere with the work at the mines would
be foolish to denyU In Cook V. Dolan the defendants
"with the permission of Joseph Arnold established a"camp on
his farm within one-half mile of the plaintiff's pit mouth'
Of the conduct of the campers, the court saysi "Did the ftfx
defendants and those who were acting with them cross the
line which divides a lawful find an unlawful assembly and
the line which divides legitimate persuasion and uklawful
coercion in the manner in which they conducted their camp?
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We think they kxxz did.... It certainly cannot be
claimed that calling a working miner a 'scab' a 'blackleg',
a 'black sheep', a 'blackleg s- b-.' and threatening him
if he did not come out now that armed men would be sent for,
and threatening that personal violence, 'knocking off his
ears,?' would '.e resorted if he went to work, is legiti~iate
persuasion. Such language is clearly intei;ded to coerce a
and not persuade. ... Three or four hundred men
marching under the plaintiff's tramway and close to their
pit-mouth and miners' houses, all armed with a walking sticx
singing 0We'll hang blacklegs on a sour apple tree?' in view
of the ipprobriols epithets to which we have referred, and
a frequent repktition of 'his marching, was evidently calcul.-
ted, if not in~ended, to impress fear on those miners who
desired and were working, rather than to conciliate and win
them to the strikers' way of thinking. And more than thA.
it was a trespass on the plaiintiffs' land, which had been
forbidden. For the last ten days the little
village or cluster of miners' houses near the pit-mouth of
the plaintiffs' mine has been patrolled bi every night, and
at almost all hours of the night, by squads consisting of
from ten to fifteen men. And miners who desired to work
and who went to work before daylight were intercepteik by
these squads; and the men composing these squads during the
night talked in front of and near miners' houses, using lan-
guage which showed a decided hostility on their part +o
those mdners who worked and whose families lived in these
houses. Such a course of conduct on the part of campers
has the featvreg, of the conduct of a military camp in a
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time of war, and is sugestive of a campaig. , of force and not
legitimate persuasion. Such conduct could not help in-
spiring fear on the part of those acting in opposition to
the wishes of the strikers, and the testimony shows ,at it
has done so, and that some of the plaintiffs' miners have
been forced to quit by the fear thus inspired"
In Rogers V. Evarts, Judge 8grith said? "There may be
cases, however, wheve -persuasion and entreaty are not lawful
instruments to effect the purpose of a strike. Even per-
suasion and entreaty ma- be used in such a manner, with such
persistency, and with such environments as to constitute
intimidation. Their use then becomes a violation of law.
S. In People V. Kostka, 4 N. Y. Cr. R., 434, Justice
Barrett says: 'The mere fact that no violence was used in
the streets is not conclusive. It is for you (the jory)
to say whether the attitude of these men was threatening.
Nor is it necessary that there should have been a direct
threat. If you believe that the attitude actually pre-
sented by the distributors of these circulars was an atti-
tude of intimidation, either to the passervby or to the
womnan inside, considering all the circumstances, then all
who participated in it, directly or indirectly, are within
the meaning of that Word 'intimidation'?, as uised in +he
conspiracy act.' It stands conceded by defendants coon-
sel that the strikers have not the right to assemble in
front of a factory in such numbers as to constitute intimi-
dation. Picketing may be done in such numbers as to con-
stitute intimidation. Jebring and shouting at employes
may constitute intimidation. Persuasion or entreaty may
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be so persistent as to constitute intimidation. Whereverk
the strikers assume towards the employes an attitd& Z
,. , , i &d sitreaty; with words however
smooth, may constitute intimidation, which will render those
who use them liable to the penalties of both the civil and
criminal law. .... It may be impossible to lay down
a general rule as to wha$ surroundin,:- circumstances will
characterize persuasion and entreat, as intimidation. Each
case must probably depend on its own surroundings. But
where the evidence presents such a case as to convince the
court that the emplofes are being induced to leave the em-
plo,er by operating up_ their fears rather than ,pon their
Jdgment or their sympathy, the court will be quick to lend
ist strong arm to its protection. Rights guaranteed by
law will be enforced by the courts, whether invoked by em-
ployer or emplo--,e
In TU. S. V. Kane, 23 Fed., 748, the present Mr,/
justice Brewer illuistrated 'he proposition by this figre?
"Supposing Mr. W. had two men employed, and that he finds
that in the management of his little farm he is not making
enough so that he"'can afford to 5employ two labore'rs, and
he says to one bf them: 'Iwill have to get along without
your services, and Iwill do with 'he services of the other?'
and the one leaves. That is all right. Supposing the
one who leaves goes to the one wh-o has not left and says to
him: 'Now, look here; leave with me,' givf.n7 whatever rea-
sons he sees fit, whatever reasons he can adduce,- and the
other one says, 'Well I will leave?' and he leaves because
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his co-laborer has persuaded him to leave; that is all right,
Mr. Wheeler has nothing to say; he may think that the rea-
sons that the one that is leaving has given to the one that
he would like to have itay are frivolous, not such as oughtt
to induce him to leave, but that is those gentlemen's busi-
ness. If the one whom he would like to have stay is in-
clined to go because his friend has urged, has persuaded
him, has induced him to leave, Mr. W. cannot say anything.
That is the right of both these man,- the one to make sugges-
tions, give reasons, and the other to listen to them, and
act upon them.
"But supposing - and I will take the illustration I
partially suggested yesterday - supposing one is discharged
and the other wants to stay, is satisfied withthe employment,-
and the one that 'eaves goes atoind to a number of friends
a-ld gat,,ers +hem, and they come around, a large body of ther;,
as T suggested yesterday, a party with revolvers and muskets
and the one that leaves comes to the one that wants to
stay and says to him, 'Now, my friends are here, you had
better leave: I request you to leave;' the man looks at the
party that is standing there; there is nothing but a simple
request:- that is so far as the lang-oage which is used;
there is no threat; but it is a -equest backed by a demon-
stration of force, a demonstration intended to intimidate,
calculated to intimidate, and the man says: 'Well I would
like to stay, I am willing to work here, yet there are to
many men here, there is to mrnuoh of a demonstration; I am
afraid to stay.' Now, the comrmoi; sense of every man teLls
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h him that this is not a mere request,- tells him that while
the language used may be very polite and be merely in the
form of a request, yet it is accompanied with that backing
of force intended as a demonstration and calculated to make
an impression; and that the man leaves really because he
is intimidated.
"If I take another illustration, Iill make it even
more plain. Supposing half a dozen men stop a coach, with
revolvers in their hands, and one man askts the passengers
politely to step out and pass over their valuables; and sup-
posing those man should be put on trial before any court for
robYpry, would not you despise a judge who would say,- 'why
there was no violence; there wero no threats; there was
simply a request to these passengers to hand over their
valuables, and they handed them over; it was simply a re-
quest and a loan of their valuables! Would not the common
sense of every man say that that request, no matter how
politely it was expressed, was a request backedA a demonstra-
tion of force that was really "M,,, 'ifrr, an made the
offense rob1ery? Would not you expect any judge to say
that? Would not you despise any one who would say other-
wise? .t 1''
In Allen V. Flood Lord Hershell said, "In another
passage in his opinion the learned judge (Hawkins) says that
there is no authority for the proposition that to render
threatsp menaces, intimidation or coercion available as
elements in a cause of action, they must be oC such a char-
acter as to create fear of personal violence. I quite
28.
agree with this. The threat of violence to property is
equally a threat in the eye of the law.'
It will thus be seen that intimidation "is the effect
of such things, said or done, or threat made, as reasonably
put one in fear, -und control his freedom of action, or thus
corn pel one to act out the will of another instead of his
own will'.' Parker V. Bricklayer's Tunion, 21 Wk. L. B.225.
The grounds for equitable interference in these cases
have been variously staled but it is generally said to be
founded on the irreparable n ature of the injury, the preven-
tion of a multiplicity of suits, the restraining a nuisance,
and the p-otection of property. In Brusche V. Furniture
Makers Union it was said, "It is contended that such acts
of defendants as are properly alleged constitute offenses
punishable as crimes, and that a court of equity will not
enjoin the commission of a crime, and that the civil remedy
by an action for damages is full, adequate and complete.
On the other hand the complainant contends that although the
defendants are liable to indictment yet their action and
threatened movements are such an invasio, of property rights
as require -the preventive process of injunction, arid , hat
without such process a continuing and irreparable injury
will be wrought, for which there is no adequate mxremedy at
law. The latter contention seems 11o be well founded. ;'
In a bill like this presenting a case of manifest merit and
great wrong to the complainant, the court will not search..
for technicalities or fine spun theories upon which to
support a refusal of relief but will follow the well settled
29.
rules which are well stated in the case of Parker V. 'Vinni-
piseogee Co., 2 Black, 454, where the court says: 'A court
of equity will interfere where the injury by the ,v7rorigful
act of the adverse party will be irreparable, as where the
loss of health, the loss of trade, the destruictibn of the
means of subsistance, or the ruin of property must ensue.
. . . It will also give its aid to irevent oppresive and
interminable ilitigation or a multiplicit,/ of suits; or
where the injury is of such a nature that it cannot be ad-
equal-ely compensated by damages at law, or is such as from
its continuance or permanent mischdef must occasion a con-
stantly recurring greviance, which cannot be prevented other
wise 'han by injunstion'
In McCandless V. O'Brien the court said that defen-
dants were "guilty of acts which constitute a nuisance"
Speaking of its power to restrain a nuisance the court said,
"Even if the expression 'rights of individuals', in the act
of 1836, means only -'ights of property which can be handled
and technically trespassed upon. The court has jiurisdic-
tion to enjoin a continuing trespass, but its jiurisdiction
is not limited to such cases. Without touching the prop-
erty of plaintiffs, defendants may commit acts which consti-
tute a nuisance and infringe upon rights of property. The
principle which in such cases justify and require the inter-
ference of a court of equity, are closely allied to if not
identical with, those applicable to tresspass. In trespass
there isc direct infringement of one's right of property-
in nuisance it is consepuential. In either case equity
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will afford relief by injunction, if the injury be such as
is not susceptible of adequate pecuniary compassation in
damages, or one the continuance of which would be a constant
ly recurring greivance"
In Blindell V. Hagan, 54 Fed., 40, the court says,
"Where there is a large comiination of persons to interfere
with a parties business by violence, the equitable ju-is-
diction, if maintainable at all, is maintainable on either
of two grounds,- the nature of the injury, including the di
ficulty of establishing in a suit at law the amount of ac-
tual damage suffered, or the prevention of a multiplicity
of suits. The jurisdiction fot these reasons, was main-
tained in the following cases: Emack V. g , 34 Fed., 47/
Casey V. Typographical Union, 45 Fed., 135, 144. , Gilbert
V. pickle, 4 Sandf.,Ch., 381? (marg. P. 357.) Sherry V.
Perkins, 147 Mass., 212"
ho P i c k e t i n g.
Picketing by strikers is placing a patrol of men at
or near the place of business of the complainant to watch
such place for the purpose of ascertaining the mamnLx of
the employes, and customers, in order, that the strikers may
persuade them to cease working for or trading with the com-
plainant. Is picketing unlawful? In Perkins V. 1ogg
I
28 Wk. L. Bull., 32, 35, Smith J.1, said, "The system of
sending a committee to the neighborhood of a factory, as was
done in this aase, is one that has frequently been adopted
before in case of strikes, and may be legal or illegal ac-
cording as it is in interference or not, with the right of
labor as I have defined it" -The definition is as follows,
"The right which the striking workmen claims for- himself,
and to which he is justly entitled, viz. toA he pleases
and to ask for his work such wages as he shall deem proper,
is also a right which he must accord to ever' ofher workman
in the community; and while the law permits him to endeavor,
by reasonable a"gument, and persuasion, to induce another to
adopt his views and to cease work and to join him in his
demand for higher wages; yet he has no right by threats,
intimidation or molestation, or b-' any form of coersion or
compulsion to interfere with the exercise of the free will
of a fellow workman. Such interference is an invasion of
'he right of free labor, for which the striking workman is
himself contending"
In Veglehan V. Gluntner a patrol of Amen was maintained
in front of the plaintiff's factory from half past six in
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the morning till half past five in the afternoon. "The
number of men was greater at +imes, and at times showed some
little disposition to stop the plaintiff's door7 "The
patrol was maintained as one of the means of carrying out
the defendants' plan, and it was used in combination with
social pressure, threats of personal injury or unlawful
harm, and persuasion to break existing contracts. It was
thus one means of intimidation indirectly to the plaintiff
and directly to persons actually emploed, or seeking to be
employed, by the plainti'f, and of rendering such employ-
merit intolerable to such persons. Such an act is an un-
lawful interference with the rights both of employer and of
employedV "No one can lawfully interfere by force or in-
(
timidation to prevent employers or persons employed or wish-
ing to be employed from the exercise of these rights....
Intimidation is not limited to threats of viblence or of
physical injury to person or property. It has a broader
signification, and there ma also may be a moral intimidation
which is illegal. Patrolling or picketing, under the
circumstances stated in the report, has elements of intim-
idation like those which were found to exist in Sherry V/
Perkins, 147 Mass., 2121.
See Rogers V . Evarts, 17 N Y. Supp., 264 and same
case on appeal in 67 Hun, 294, at p. 299. Reg. v. Druitt
10 Cox Cr. Cases, 592,601. Reg. v. Sheppard, 11 Cox Cr.
mases, 325, 327. Reg. v. Hilbert, 13 Cox Cr. Casts,82.
For an interesting case on picketing and the effect of the k
later Englisk Statutes see, Lyons v. Wilkins, 1896,1 CH.,311
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C i r c u 1 a r s.
It is generally and correctly stated that equity xiii
has no jurisdiction to restrain a libel. Kid v. Iforry, 26
Fed., 773 and cases cited. But the fact still remainA
that equity has granted injunctions restraining the distri-
butions of circulars, posters, &c. in many cases, If they
were not restrained as being libelous, why was relief grant-
ed? The earliest case rearing on the subject is Gilbort
v. Mickle, In this case the complainant was an auction-
eer, lawfully entitled to do and doing business in New York
City. The defendant (mayor of the city),- "complaints
having been repeatedly made to him against the establish-
ment of the Oaixki± complainant, as being a mock auction-
eur"- Drdered a man stationed in front of complainant's
place of business bearing "aba'ner with this strange device?-
"Strangers, Beware of Mock auctioneers.' The Vice-Chan-
cellor said, "It is clear to !y mind, that the obstruction
of the complainant's lawful business, as detailed in the b
bill, constitute.; a nuisance against which equity xiii,
under brdinary circumstances, is bound to relieve. / / / /
In this instance, on the case made on tile bill, although the
defendant did not interfere with the complainantt s trade and
occupation as an auctioneer, by blocking up the street and
side walk in front of his store, with teams or carts, so as
to impede the free ingress and egress of merchants and other
who might desire to attend his sales; he interripted aiid
destroyed the complainant's business more effectually, by
keeping a man posted before the door of the latter, with the
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placard in staring capitals, 'Strangers, Be-orare of Mock
Auctioneers! It may be that the placard wa, a libel,
which, unless justified, would subject the defendant to
corresponding punishment, both by wa' of damages and by in-
dictment, but it was none the less a private nuisance,
injuriously and summarily affecting the property and lawful
pursuits of the complainant, and as such, it wa falls with-
in the clearly established, and I may justly add, benefi.cent
jurisdiction of the court of Chancery. And I am sure, no
one will feel the slightest apprehension of an undue or
dangerous exercise of the process of chancery, if they are
pushed no farther that to prevent one individual, whether be
be high in station or a private citizen, from trampling upon
his neighbor's rights, and utterly destroying his neighbor's
trade and business, without authority of law, by means of
an offensive and false placard or standing advertisement,
kept before his store or office. The most zealous stickler
for the bill of rights~in our expiring constitution, will A.
not distrust the preservation of liberty of speech and of
the press, foomjthe suspension and punishment of such an
outrage'." The injunction was dissolved on other grounds.
The next case and the first one to apply the injunc-
tion to labor troubles, is Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley,
L. R., 6 Eq., 551. This case was heard on a demurrer to
the bill. The employes of complainant were out on a strike
and the defendants posted notices in the vicinity of com-
plainant's placeof business that read as follows:- "Wanted
all well wishers of the Operative Cotton Spinners, &c.,
As.ociation not to trouble or cause an,' annoyance to the
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Springhead Spinning Company, Lees, b' knocking at the door
of their, office until the dispute between them and the self-
actor minders is finally terminated. By special order"
"Carrodus,22, greaves Street, Oldham" The bill alleged
that"the said placards and advertisements were part of a
scheme of the defendants / / , whereby they, by threats
and intimida~ion, prevented persons from hirin 1 themselves
to, o, accepting work from, the plaintiffs, and there were
divers persons in, and in the neighborhood of Springhead,
arid elsewhere, who, by reason of such notices and the lia-
bilities under which they would place them in regard to the
association, were intimidated and prevented from hiring
themselves to the plaintidfs( Sir R. Mallins, V. C.,
granted an injunction and in the course of his opinion said
"In the present case? the acts complained of are illegal and
criminal by the Act of Geo. 4, and it is admitted by the de-
murrers that they were designedly done as a part of a scheme
by threats and intimidationx, to :,revent persons from ac-
cepting work from the plaintiffs, and as a consequence, to
destroy the value of the plaintiffs' property. It is, in
my opinion, within the jurisdiction of this court to prevent
such or any other mode of destroying property, and thexx
demurrers must therefore be overruled.
"In coming to this conclusion I desire to be under-
stood as deciding simply upon what appears upoii this bill
and these demurrers"I
It is often said that this case and Dixon v. Holden,
L. R., 7 Eq., 488, were overruled by Prudential Assurance
Co. v. Knott, L. R., 10 Ch. App., 14' , but an examination of
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that case shows that it does not go 4o that extent but simpi
criticizes some of the dicta i Dixon v. Hoideii. In Dixon
v. Holden the defendants were enjoined from publishing a
statement that the complainant was a secret partner of a
bankrupt firm and that he had concealed this fact for the
purpose of defrauding hreditors. The statement wts f&lse/
The Vice-Chancellor wasn't content with confining himself
to the case at bar but said,"The business of a merchant is
about the most valuable kind of property he can well hav'e.
Here it is the source of his fortune, and therefore to be
injured in his business is to be injured in his property.
But IP go further. and say, if it had only injured his re-
putation, it is within the jurisdicti n of this court to
stop the publication of a libel of this description, which
goes to destroy his pc'operty or his reputation, which is
his property, and, if possible, rnor valuable than other
property. In this case I go on general principle, and I
am fortified by authority. General principle is in favor
of it, but authorit, is not wantind and further on the
Vice-Chancellor says9 "In the decision I alrive at, I ±Hx±x~x
beg to be 1jnderstood as laying down, that this uourt has
jurisdiction to prevent the publication of any letter, ad-
vertisement, or other document which, if permitted to go on,
would have -he effect of destroying the -roperty of another
person, whether that consists of tangible or intangible
property, whether it consists of mone or reputation"' It
is this dicta that the court takes exception to in Assurance
Co. v. Knott. The only me-tion of the Spinning Co. case
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is that it was "decided by the Vice-Chancellor himself, upon
which of course the learned judge must be taken to have
expressed the same opinion as he expressed in the case of
Dixon v. Holden" However, no such dicta can be found
in the Spinning Co. case and it was decided solely up,,n the
grounds that the demuy-rers admitted that there were "threats
and intimidations"
In the Assur'ance Co. case, Lord Cairns, L. C. said,
"It is clearly settled that the court of chancery has no
jvrisdiction to restrain a publication merely because it
is a libel. There are publications which the Court of
Chancery will restrain, and those publications, as to which
there is a foundatisn for the jurisdiction of a Court of
Chancery to restrain them, will not berestrained the less
because thay happen also to be libelous. But apart from
the suggestion that the\ publication here is a libel, I do
not observe in the bill an sta-tement or foundati n for the
tutieiction of the court to restrain. I repeat, If the
observations are not libellous, they are lawful; and ought
not to be restrained; if they are libellous, it is only
because they are libellous that the cour- of Chancery is
asked to rest-ain them After citing authorities showing
that a mere libel will not be -estrained, he says, :- "The
only shadow of authority the other way is in the case uf
Dixon v. Holden, decided by Vice-Chancellor Mallin in the
year 1868. I say nothing about the decision in that partic-
ular case, and I do n,*t maen to say that the decision is not
capable of being raintained" He then quotes the dicta
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already qioted arid criticizes the same. The case of Routh
v. Webster, 10 Beaven, F61, upon which "Dixon v. Holden was
professed to be decided?" was then discussed and stated "to
have been quite rightly decided".' As the facts and prin-
ciple involved were ver, similar to Dixon v. Holden, it
can be readily seen that the uourt was not quarrelling with
the actilal decision in that case but with the dicta qvo'ed.
Vice-Chancellor Mallins dlivnr-d two other opinions
holding the same principle as the Spinning Co. case.
Rollins v. Minks, L. R., 13 Eq., 355, and Axrnann v. LUnd.,
L. R., 18 Eq., 330. In both cases the defendant issued
circiilars stating that he would bring suit against any persa
who -bought certain articl~es from the complainant, claiming
tha* these articles were an infringrment of his patent. The
circulars were not issued bona fide to protect his rights,
but for the purpose of '"intimidating the public and thcroby
totally destroying the trade of the ulaintiff' See Croft
V,/ Richardson, 59 How. Pr., 3r6.
In Sherry v. Perkins the defendants were restraind
from carrying a banner in the street in front of complain-
ants place of business havihg the following inscription,
"Las-ers on a strike and lasters are requested to keep away
from P. P. Sherry's until the present trouble is settled.
Per order L. P. T1.' The court said, "The case finds that t1-
Ihe defendants entered imts , with others, into a scheme,
by threats and intimidation, to prevent persons ix x x
ployment of the plaintiff
jZ:Mnt~ andto prevet*R~ A othe r fr orntemuing in su ch empl oy-
ment, and to prevent others from enteving into such employ-
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ment. /. . . The act of displaying banners with devices
as a means of threats and Intimidationx to prevent persons
from entering into or continuing in the employment of the
plaintiffs, was injurious to the plaintiffs, and was ille-
gal at common law and by statute. . . . We think that the
plaintiffs are not restricted to their remedj by an actiox
at law, but are entitled to relief by injunction. The acts
and 4he injury were continiious"
In Emack v. kana a -,atentee of a "noiseless slate"
issued circulars under conditibns similar to those mentioned
in the English cases, arid an injunction was granted.
Blodgett,J., said, "It may not be libellous for the owner
of a patent to charge that an article made by another man-
ufacturer infringes his patent: and notice of an alleged
infringement, may, if given in good faith, be a considerate
and kind acy on the .,art of the owner of the pateht; but
he gravamen of this case is the attempted intiiLid-.L, ,,byf
/
digendants of complainant's customers by threatening them
with suits which defendants did not intend to prosecute,
and this feature was not involved in Kidd v. Houry. I can-
not believe that a man is remediless against persistent and
continued attacks upon his business, and property rights in
his business, such as have been perpetrated by these defen-
dants against the complainant, as shown by the proof in
this case. It shocks my sense of justice to say that a
court of equity cannot restrain systematic and methodical
outrages like this, by one man upon another's property r±kkk
rights. If a court of equity cannot reatrain an attack
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like this upon a man's business, then the party is certainly
remediless, becaiuse an actiml at law in most cases would do
no good and ruin would be accomplished before an adjudica-
tion would be reached. ...
"The effect of the circulars sent by the defendant,
Kane, certainly must have been to intimidate dealers from
buying of complainant, or dealing in slates of his manufac-
tulre, because of the alleged infringement of the Goodrich
patent. No busines-s man wants to incur the dangers of a
law suit for the profits he may make as a jobber in handling
goods charged to be al. infringement of another man's Datent.
The inclination of m4ost business men is to avoid litigation
and to forego even certaitn profits, if threatened with a
law suit which would be embarrassing and vexatious, and
might mulct them in damages far beyond their profits; and
hence such persons, although having full faith in a man's
integrity, and in the merits of his goods, would naturally
, r
avoid dealing with him for fear of possibly bevoming in-
volved in the threatened litigation"
See ASchool Furniture Co. v. School Furniture Co1 , 92
Mich., 558. Casey v typographical Union, 45 Fed., 135.
Barr v. Trades CoujncilS, 53 N. J. Eq., 101.
I think it is clearly settled that "when the acts
complained of consist of such mis-representations of a bus-
iness that they tend to its injury, and damage to its pro-
prietor, the offense is simply a libel" and the couirts will
not graht an imjunction; but "on the contrary, when the at-
tempt to injure consists of acts or words which will operate
to intimidate and prevent the customers of a party from
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dealing with or laborers from working for bim", t e courts
will interfere by injunction. Coeur D'Alen &c. Y. Miners
Union, 51 Fed., 267.
The principle is also redognized in three English
cases decided in 1891. Salmon v. Cotes, 91 L. T., 353;
Peto v. Apperley, id., 362, 386; and Haille v. Lillingstone.
The first was decided by Judge Collins; the last two by
Judge Jeune. The judges didn't disagree on the principle,
but did disagree as to what would constitute intimidation.
See criticism on the cases at p. 393 of the same volume.
In Richter Bros. v. Tailors' Union, 24 Wk. L. Bull.,
189, 192, the inj~inction was refused because, "the petition
absolutely fails to show any act that was done pursiiant td)
the conspiracy, excepting the composing and circulation and
posting of the circulars. No workman was deterred by the
circulars or posters, or by the threats of the defendants,
from engaging in work for or from continuing in the employ-
ment of the plaintiff. No customer failed or refused to
patronize the plaintiff on either of these xi grounds.
None of these facts are shown in the petition. No fact$ or
facts, constituiting a nuisance in law, or an in4terference
with, or destruction of, the plaintiff's business, or pro-
fits, are set out in the petition. Its 'glittering gener-
alities', its conclusions of fact and law, cannot be accept-
ed as ultimate facts'
In Sinsheimer v. Garment workers, 77 Hun, 215, re-
versing, 5 Misc., 448, the injinction was dissolved because
(1) there was "no proof of any act of violence upon the part
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of the defendants, or of an-, injury to property, or of an'
threats or intimidation" because (2) the publi",ation of the
circulars had been discontinued some time before the injujnc-
tion was g-anted, and (3) because the complainants did not
come into equity with clean hands.
43.
T r e s p a s s.
As already seen strikers may use fair persuasion to
induce employes to join themlt but can the strikers trespass
upon the property of the complianant for this purpose? In
Ry. Co. v. Wenger, 17 Wk. L. Bull., 306, it was held that
they could 'ot. In this case the court said; "From these
facts, it is clear to my mino that these men, when they went
there under the circumstances under which they went there,
were clearly trespassers, and that it was altogether and
essentially unlawful to go there, even, seeking to compel
or u: o_ invite other men to abandon their employment, and
to thereby obstruct the business,.. It is a trespass. It
is a wrong, and when I say this I do not mean to quystion
the rig t of thes men off +he premises, by reasonable and
m n ti _i is for their b an advFVtag
to go elsewhere or to cease their employment. I do not
questio-. that right. I do rnot find it necessary in this
case to question the right. But what I do hold To be a
correct proposition f iFaw is that while out of the employ-
ment of this company, in this case as in other cases that
may arise, the parties so ceasing employment have no right
to go upon the premises andby force or by violence or by
threats or by intimidation or by request, ask other men to
join them, or in any wlay interfere with or interrupt the
progress of the business that is then being sought to be
carried on. I do not believe there can be any difference
of opinion among reasonable men on this subject, and I
thiqk these troubles arise, in large measure, out of a mis-
taken notion as to what the rights of men are7'
In Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell, 26 Ore., .537,
it was alleged that "the executive committee . . . without
leave or license, and without lawful business, entered the
demises of +he plaintiff and ordered all union men to quit"
"If this was a willful aggression upon plaintiff's rights,
it would constitute trespass, for which an action would lie
souinding in damages The injunction was refused because
"no intimidation is speciffically alleged or shown, unless
it can be inferred that by a refusal to quit)the members of
the union would subject themselves to the charge of insub-
ordination to the order, and it does not appear that there
was sufficient odium attached to this to put the members in
fear, or that compliance with the order and resolution was
induced thereby" Nothing wa,: said on the question of tres-
pass, but as it was a single act, already committed, and its
repetition was not threatened, it would Aot seem to be a
proper case for anN injunction. See quotation from Mackall
v. Ratchford on P / 6f .
A trespass for the purpose of interfering with com-
plainant's buisiness or destroyin- property will also be en-
joined. Coeur D'Alene &c. Co. v. miners Union, 51 Fed.
260/ Davis v. Zinmerman, 91 Hun, $89. 1ackall v. Ratch-
ford, 82 Fed., 42. My. Co. v. Wenger, 17 Wk. L. Bull.,
306. U). S. v. Debs, 64 Fed., 724. In Davis v. Zimmerman
the action was begun o restrain defendants ' . . (3) from
destroyins plaintiffs' property" In Miachall v. Ratchford,
"all persons were restrained from entering upon the property
44.
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of the Montana loal & Coke Co. for the purpose of interfer-
ing with the employes of said company, either by intimida-
tion, or by the hiolding of either private or public assem-
blages upon said proerty, or in any way molesting, interfel
ing with, or intimidati9 the employes of that company so
as to induce them to abandon their work in the said mines,
In Ry. Co. v. 'Venger, the defendants were restrained, "from
in any manner whatever molesting or interfering with any
engine, tender, car, s-withh, coupling, engine-house, depot,
watertank or prop)erty, applittenance or freight bpon said
premises"
It i3 also held that where a large body of strikers
narch up aud down the highway in the vicinity of complainan-
ts' place of business so as to interfere with with and ob-
struct his business, it is a trespass and violates an in-
junction against trespass. Cook v. Dolan. Mackall v.
Ratchford. In Cook v. Dolan the court said, "it was a
trespass upon the plaintiff's land, which had been forbidden
The highways can undoubtedly be used b, Iarge bodies of men
for parades within reasonable limits; but a 2arade which is
confined wijk±x xxzKk:Ki ±iUmIx to a limited piece of a
public road before- a pit-moli and "nder a tram-way, and
which is rereated two or three times a day for ten days or
two weeks, loses the characteristic of a legitimate p;arade,
and when directed against the interests of the owner of the
land over which the road passed, becomes a trespass. We
hold, therefore, that these marches are in violation of the
injunction, in that they . . . (2) were a trespass on their
(plaintiffs) property at or near the pit-mouth of their
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mine.' This holdig is supported by both principle and
authority. Lewis v. Jones, 1 Pa. St., 336. Rogers v.
"andall, 29 Mich., 4 . Hunt v. Rich, 38 Me., 195.
11ollenbeck v. Rowley, 8 Allen, 473. Adams v. Rivers, 11
Barb., 393. Harriso!; v. Puke of Rutland, 1893, 1Q. 3., 142
The g'ounds for restraining a trespass are well stat-
ed in Rivhter Bros. v. Tailors Un/ion,where it is said, "The
t/respass if a single act, must be irreparable, the injury
threa'ened or done must be of such a character, that 'e
property injured cannot be Testored to its former condition,
or that compen.3ation cannot be afforded by damages. If the
trespass is continuouis in its character, though not destruc-
tive, irreparable, then a court of equity entertains juris-
diction, because by an action at law the plaintiff cannbt
recover damages which constitute a complete and certain re-
lief. 3 Por. Eq. J/, sec. 1357,,
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P a y i n g I o n e y &c.
In Rogers v. Evarts it was held that "the offer by
defendants of money to pay expenses of the employe is lADful.
The assistance given to 4 hose needing it is lawful, even if
offered as an inducement to the employe to leave. It is
o-nly a just provision to those who have surrendered their
wages, perhaps from sympathy form defendants. The posting
of names of those who contribute to funds sought and law-
fully used for sustaining the strike, and of those who re-
fuse to contribute, is lawful as long as the strikers keep
within the law. If, however, their purpose be an unlawful
on*,and n ot for an advance of wages, or if they seek to
un
accomplish a lawful end by 'lawful means, t' en they are guilty
of illegal conspiracy, and the posting of the names of the
contributors and non-contributors is a part of such conspir-
acy and unlawful"
The converse of this proposition is held in the En-
glish cases of Warburton Y/ H-uddersfield Industrial Society,
1892, 1 Q. B., 817;
kxxRx,x~xxx~xyx99R and Farrer v. Close, L. R., 4 Q. B.,602.
However these case seem to be. governed by the construction
put on the English Statutes and the by-laws of the associa-
tions concerned. It wokld seem that on principle the New
York case is correct. The strikers have certainly kept
"within the law! The offer of money is surely not a threat
or intimidation, but rather a species of 'peaceable I or
'moral' persuasion.
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B O Y C 0 T T S.
In-o3race Bros. v. Evans, 18 Pitts. L. J., 399, it is
said; "In popualr kaxgxxg, acceptation it (boycott) is an
organized effort to exclude a person from business relations
with others by persuasion, intimidation and other acts which
tend to violence and thereby coerce him through fear of re-
sulting injury, to submit to dictation in the management of
his affairs" It will be noticethat the above definition
assumes that a boyjcott is in its essence unlawful, but there
are many cases holding the contrary and it would not seem
to be necessarily true. A much better definition is the
one given by Judge Taft in Toledo &c. Co. v. Penn. Co., 54
Fed. 730/ He4Qsays, "As usually understood, a boycott is a
combination of many to cause a lass to one person by'coerc-
ing others, against their will, to withdraw from him their
beneficial business intercourse, through threats that, un-
less those others do, the many will cause similar harm to
them" By 'coercion' Judge Taft evidently-rmeans the 'moral
persuasion' caused by a fear of loosing the profits of their
business and not the use5of unlawful force or acts, for he
says, "Ordinarily, when such a combination of persons does
not use violence, actual or threatened, to accomplish their
purpose, it is dificlt to point out with clearness the il-
legal means or endx which makes the combination an unlawful
conspiracy; for ittis generally lawful for the combiners'to
withdraw their intercourse and its benefits from any person,
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and to announce their intenlion of doi"It so, and it is
equally lawful for the others, on their own motion, to do
that which the combiners seek to compel them to do'
Thus, we see that a boycott is an organized effort
to destroy the biisiness of a certain person and it may be
either lawful or unlawful. It is very difficult to point
out just where the line falls between a lawful and an un-
lawful boycott, on account of the contradict/inns to be
found in the cases.
I take it to be a sound proposition of law that a man
cannot recover in an action against another, unless he has
been injured; and that a man cannot be injured unless he
has A legal right and this lagal right has been infringed
and he has suffered damage thereby. Rogers v. Rajendro
Dutt, 13 M.oo. P. C!, 209, 241. Larson v. Ohase, 47 Minn.,
307. In a boycott is any legal right of the person boy-
cotted invaded? It is simply an attempt to prevent him
from entering into business relations with others, to pre-
vent 1im from making future contracts, in other words, to
interfere with his right to gain a livelihood. Supposing
a combination of men, for the purpose of ruining A, persuade
all wholesalrs to refrain from dealing with A, uising no
unlawful means, does A have an action? In the solution of
that problem, I assume that if the combination have s-he right
to so persuade the whol alers then a cannot recover, for "an
by a malicious or bad motive
act lawful in itself is not converted"into an unlawful act
so as to make the doer of the act liable to a civil action,
But have they the right? They have unless thej have inter-
fered with some right of A's. With what right of A's have
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they interfered?, Simply the right which Svery man has "to
pursue his trade or calling without molestation or obstruc-
tion, and any who by any act, though it be not otherwise un-
lawful, molests, or obstructs him is guilty of a wrong un-
less he can s :ow lawful justification of excuse for so doing,
Unless this is a correct proposibion of law I fail to see
how the boycott cases can be sustained.
,Instead of commencing with the first case I will star+
with one of the latest. In the late English case of Allen
v. flood, 1898, A. C., 1, the -Ilaintiffs, memhers of one
trade union, were employed in making repairs on a ship. The
defendant was a delegate of another trade -union, some of
the members of which were employed on the same ship. Defen-
dant informed the employers that unless the plaintiffs were
discharged all the ironworkers (his union men) would quit w.z
work Saying that "he plaintiffs had been doing ironwork in
another ward. The plaintiffs were discharged and bring
this actiort for damages. The plaintiffs were employed
by the day but would have been retained but for this inter-
ference. The case was full considered and the House of
Lords finally decided that the action would not lie. I do
not now quarrel with the result of Allen v. Flood but I do
quarrel with the ratio deciondi of the Lords. They decid-
ed that (1) the proposition I have stated was not sound law
and (2) that as no unlawful means were used to procure
plaintiffs discharge the action would not lie.
Let us examine the authorities bearing on the first
proposition and see what result is obtained. In Comyn's
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Digest (Action on the Case, A,) it is said, "In all cases
where a man has a temporal loss, or damage by the wrong of
another, he may have an action upon the case, to be repaired
in damages" In Viner's Abridgement (Actions on the Case,
n. c. 3,) it is said, "If those that are coming to my market
are disturbed, or beat, per qujod, I lose my toll, an action
upon 1-he case lies" And again, (same title, 21,) "If a
man menaces my tenants at will, of life and members, per
quod they depart fnom their tenures, an4 action upon the cas
lies against him" In Turner v. Sterling, 2 Vent., 25,
Wylde,J., said (44 41Edw. III, 24,B,) "If I have an
horse or beast market, and a toll for sale, and one hinder
the beasts from coming hither, non constat whether they
should !,e sold, yet for the possibility of that and of the
loss of the toll thereon, an action lies In the Abbe of
Ddnesham case, 29 Edw. II1, 18, b, the Abbe by grace of the
King was entitled to hold a fair at Stow, and the defendants
with "force and arms" disturbed "certain persons coming to
the aforesaid fair," whereby the Abbe 'lost his toll and the
profits of the fair, to the damage," Mc. This was held
actionable. In Keeble v. Hickeringill, 11 TEast 574n;
s. c. polt 14, 17, 19; 3 salk 9; 11 Modern 74,1-50, the def-
endant maliciously fired a gun near the plaintiff's decoy
and drove the wild-fowl away. Holt, C. J., said that thes
was a good cause of action. In the course of his opinion
he said, "This is his (plja njff) trade; and he that hin-
ders another in his trade or livelihood is liable to an ac-
tion for so hindering him7' And again, "V7her.e a violent or
5;:.
malicious act is done to a man's occupation, pvofession, or
way of getting a livelihoe; thefe An action lies in all
cases. But if a man doth ',im damage by using the same
employment; as if Mr. Hicket'ingill had set lip another decoy
on his own ground near the pd aintiff, and that had spoiled
the custom of the plaintiff, no action would lie, because
he had as much liberty to make and use a decoy as the plain-
tiff. This is like the case of 11 H. IV, 47. One school-
master set up a new school to the damage of anmxx ancient
school, and thereby the scholArs are allured from the old
there
school to come to his new. (The action"was held not to lie)
But suppose Mr. H ickeringill should lie in the way with his
gins, and fright the boys from going to school, and their
parents would not let them go thither; sure that school-
master might have an action for the loss of his scholars.
* . 4*an hath a market, to which he hath toll for horses
sold; a man is bringing his horses to market to sell; a
stranger hinders and obstructs him from going thither; an
action lies because it imports damage. Action upon the
case lies against one that shall by threats fright away his
tenants at will" Carrington v. Taylor is an extreme c
case. Here the defendant was shooting fowl for his own
benefit where he had a lawful right to shoot. Fe frighten-
ed the ducks away from the plaintiff's decoy and was held
liable for so doing. This case can hardly be supported.
In Tarleton v. M'Gawley, Peake 11 P. , 270, the plaintiff',
vessel was lieing o~f the coast of Africa at Calabar where
he was trading with the natives. The defendant,"well
knowing the premises, but contriving and maliciously intend-
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ing to hinder and deter the natives from trading" with the
plaintiff, "with force and arms, fired . . . a certain can-
non loaded with gunpowder and shot at the said canoe, and
killed one of the natives on board the same. Whereby the
natives of the said coast were deterred and hindered from
trading with " &c. ahd plaintiffs lost their trade. Lord
Kenyon held that the action would lie. In Ibotson v.
Peat, 3 H. ,, C., 643, the plaintiff had enticed and allured
certain grouse from the lands of the Duke of Rmtand by
placing on his own land "near to the lands of the said Duke,
quantities of corn and other substances on which grouse feed
and was then and the'e about to shoot the said grouse,
wherefore the defendant' as the servant of the said Duke,
and by his command, in order to prevent the plaintiff from
shooting" &c. "fired, explod-ed, and projected, and caused
to be fired, exploded and projected, certain offensive, in-
jurious, noxious, terrifying and dangerous rockets, fire-
works, missils, projectiles and combustibles, and made and
caused to be made xxx±at divers loud, jarring, annoying and
disturbing noises close to and over the said lands of the
plaintiff., Thereby the grouse and other game "were scare4
frightened and driven away from the said land of the plain-
tiff" The judges were unanimously of the opinion that this
was actionable. In Garrett v. Taylor, Cro. Jac., 567, s.
c., 2 Rolle,163, the plaintiff was the owner of a stone
quarry, and the defendant, "to discredit and deprive him of
the commodity of the said mine, imposed so many and so great
threats upon. his workmen, and all come-s distrrbed, threat-
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ening to mayhem and vex them with suits if the bought any
stones Ef ±k; whereupon they all desisted from buying
and the othe.s from working &c1.1 1'eld, "The threatening to
mayhem, and suits, whereby they durst Lot work or buy, is
a great damage to the plaintiff, and his loosing the benefit
of his quarries a godd cause of action"' In Guntner v.
Astor, 4 J. B. Foore, iJ,, "4e defen'Jants clandestiniely sent
for his (plaintiff) workmen, and hav- ng caused them to be
intoxicated, induic d them to leave him and come to them -
by which the plaintiff was nearly if not qx±t absoll tely
ruined" A~ew trial was moved fc# on the ground (inter
alia) "that as the me , worked by the piece, each of them was
justified in leaving the plaintilf when he had completed the
worX he had ih hand" The motion was denied.z btxxk xx
A±&x±dgi, R zxmiax &A* :kk k x R xx frx In Bennett v/
Allcott, 2 D. & E., 166, 4he de-"endant seduced the daughter
fo the plaintiff, s'e being over twenty-one. There was no
existing co:itract of service between the father and daughter
The plaintiff was allowed to recover. In Evans V. Walton
L.R., 2 C. P., 615, the defendant enticed away the plaintiff
daughter who was nineteen years of age. The defendant did
not debauch her, and ther was no contract of service. In
this case 'he action for seduction woold not lie. The
Plaintiff recovered. In Levet's case, Cro. Eliz., 289,
the plaintiff was an inn-holder in D. and "The defendant
spake these words, 'Thy houise is infected with the pox; and
thy wife was laid of the pox Held, "Actionable for it is
a discredit to the ,plaintiff and guests would not resort
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thither" IN Riding v. Smith, 1 Ex. Div., 91i the defen-
dant stated that the plaintiff's wife, who assisted plain-
tiff in conducting his business, had been guilty of adul-
tery, whereby plaintiff lost trade and customers.
It will be >%oticed that in all these cases except
Keeble v. Hickeringill, Carrington v. Taylor, Ibotson v.
Peat, a-n4 the last tw3 the act which "he defendant procured
the third party to desist from doing, was not one which the
plaintiff could 'ave compeled the third party to perform.
It was simply one which would probably have been done if
the defendant had not interfered. In other words the
plaintiff's right to do business withoiut moles-ation has
been interfered with and he has been allowed to recover.
There are no other grounds on which the action can be based.
IN many of the cases means that were in se unlawful were
used to accomplish the desireot end. In Allen V/ Flood,
it is sought to distinguish them on this ground. (p. 66,
104, 135, ic.- The Lords woijld have us believe that if
A stands in front of B's s-tore and (without using any un-
lawful means),persuades customers not to enter and trade
with B, then B has no action; But if A stands there with a
cliub and prevents customers from entering, Ahas an action,
simply because in one case the means used are in e lawful
and in the other unlawful. I can readily understand how
the customers in the second case could have anlction for
assault and in the first case they could not, but I cannot
see why B has an action in one ca;e and not in the other for
the reaso-ns given by the House of Lords. What right has
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been interfered with in the second case that was not interfered
with in the first? Has the use of unlawful force by A ag-
ainst the customers created a new right in B? I apprehend
not. He either has or he has not a right, and bf he has the
right it has been infringed in both cases; if he hasn't any
right, there aan be no action in either case. If it were said
that he had a right but we will allow any interference with
that right which isn't brolight about by the use of unlawful
means, then we would have and understandable proposition; but
to deny the right and allow an action where unlawful means are
used and simply for that reason is nothing if it is notincom-
prehensible.4: Bu3t that is ca1tically what the majority of the
Lards say in Allen v. Flood.^ Lord Herschell says, (p. 137)
"Speaking generally, l/elieve these actions would equally have
been maintainable if a similar wrongful act had caused damage
to, qrihad affected the legal right of, a person wholly un-
connected with trade" I quite agree with Lord Herschell that
an action would lie where the wrongful act had "affected the
legal rights" of another, but I can't see how the action would
lie where the wrongfijl act had simply "caused damage ", unless
that damage had been suffered through the invasion of a legal
right. If A does a wrongful act, does every one who suffers
damage thereby have an action? I think not. It is gener-
ally conceded thatia man has no property right in percolating
underground waters." &onIfM.A digs a well on his land for the
purpose of cutting off B's supply, B has no, action, for no
right, of his has been interfered with and the personal spite
of A makes no difference. But suppose X, using no unlawful
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means, maliciously induces A to dig the well, does B have an
action? Iishould sayino, for no right of his has been in-
terfered with. Go one step further, A refuses to dig
the well, andgets his gun, arid says to A, "Dig or you are
a dead man" A digs and ]I's water supply is cut off, does
B have an action? He has suffered damage through the wrong
ful act of X against A, but what right of his has been in-
terfered with? Has he been deprived of anything he had
a legal right too? The answer clearly is, no. A man
cannot suffer legal damage unless a right of his has been
interfered with. A certainly has his action for assault
arid thetdamage to his freehold, but where B comes in is
more than I can fathom. The same illustrations could be
appliedAto the building of a high fence for the purpose of
cutting off B's light aad air. In England B would have an
action because there a man has a rigt to his light and air,
but in, this country he wouldtnot for he hasn't any such
right. And yet they tell uscthat inoGarrett v.(,Taylor
and Tarletonjv. M'Gawley the plaintiff was allowed to re-
cover because4he had suffered damage through the wrongful
act of the defendant. I should say that he was allowed to
recover because "a right" of his had been infringed, and
there was no legal excuse for the infringement. That right
was the right to gain a livelihood. A man cannot suffer
legal damage from any act (wrongful or not) of another, un-
less that act has interfered with some right of,"his to his
detriment. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn., 307' Hannam v.
Mockett, 2 B & C., 934.
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The key note of the situation is struck in Sibver &
State Council v. Rhodes, 7 Colo. App., 211, where the court
says, "The plaintiff is a corporation, and to entitle it
to relief it must appear that its corporate rights are threa-
tened with some injury of a kind which may be made the sub-
ject of an action, and for which courts have the power to
afford redfes. The complaint is that the defendants
have banded together and conspired to 'exterminate' the
plaintiff; and that they propose to accomplish their purpose
by compelling its mgmbers to leave it. Of course, when
its members have all withdrawn, it will be extinct. We
nedd not discuss the character of the means to be employed
for its disintegration. Whether they are legal or ille-
gal, thay cannot be made the subject of an action in favor
of the Lpaintiff. It has no prop-ety in its members, and
in loosing them it sustains no damage which the law necog-
nizes as damag. It cannot compel its members to re-
main with it, and if they are violently driven out of it,-
if they arelforced to relinquish their membership against
their will,- the greivance is theirs and not the plaintiff(S
Or if, for the ptirpo6e of forcing their withdrawal, others
by means of 'boycotts' or 'strikes', are made to suffer, the
latter must fight their own battles. The law does not
make the plaintiff their champion. The disorganization
and resulting extinction of the plaintiff would doubtless
be a calamity; but it is one which the law is powerless to
avert" It isn't necessary to agree with the court in
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holding that the plaintiff "has no property in its members",
but assuming that it has none, then whether the means used
to obtain their withdrawal be legal or illegal can certainly
make no difference so far as plaintiff's right to recover
is O....h c ,pf the word unlawful' is most unfortunate and
it isqas liable to cause as much trouble as the word 'mali-
cious/' It cannot te accurately defined. If it had
been confined to acts which were in themselves criminal or
which would give rise to an action in tort entirely uncon-
nected with this subject we would have something definite,
,but it isn't so confined. Indeed it isn't even confined
to overt acts but includes threats to do acts and the gath-
ering of large hostile crowds &c. It is quite well settled
that the threat to harass one with groundless suits will be
enjoined, even under circumstances where an action for mali-
cious prosecution would not lie. Opprobrious epithets
also fall within the proscribed class. Either of these
offenses could be committed under circumstances where they
would be neither criminal or tortious, but every well re-
gulated mind will instinctively say that they are not decent
methods of persuasion, and that no court should stamp them
as 'lawful'. Social ostracism seems to have fallen under
the ban in\(eglehan v. Guntner. This is an entirely diffe-
ent thing from thosep mentioned and one which may be the
subject of grave,! doubt. (It certainly was in that case.)
it is not so easy to see why this should bedcalled unlawful.
It would weem to stand o-: an equal footing with a -efusal
to have business in4ercourse. It is both decent and proper
b.
However there can be no accurate definition given of the6Q.
word 'unlawful' as used in this connection. One can only
guess at whether a certain thing is or is not a nuisance by
looking up the decided cases, so it is with 'unlawful' means,
In the cases of Keeble v. hickeringill, Carrington v.
Taylor,and Ibotson v. Paatl we have a different combination
of circumstances. In these cases the defendant had driven
awajgame from the plaintiff's land by firing guns aid--4. on
his own adjoining land. It is attempted to distinguish
these xases on the ground that the acts constituted a nui-
sance. (p. 27, 133, 174), and Lord Herschell lays down
this astounding proposition of law, (133) "The case may be
supported, and the observation of Lord Holt, which has been
quotedA expliined by the circumstance that if the defendant
ner-ely fired on his own land in the ordinary use of it,
his neighbor could make no complaint, whilst, if he was not
firing for any legitimate purpose, connected with the or-
dinary se of the land, he might be held to commit a nui-
sance. sIn this view of it Keeble v. Hickeringill has,
of course, no bearing on the present case" I say this
proposition is astounding because it makes the act a nui-
sance "if he wag not firing for any legitimate purpose, con-
nected with the ordinary use of the land" and not a nuisance
id he "merely fired on his own land in the ordinary use of
it" It strikes me that there are many cases in which the
lawful use of property has been declared a nuisance on ac-
count of the sbrroundAng circumstances. ood says, (p.1O)
"It is merely a question of rights. The motives of the
parties have no connection with the inquiry, or bearing upon
61.
the result. Qn act, hawever malicious, however wrongful
in its intent, or however serious in its consequences, may
be so far within the scope of the parties right as not to
be a -,uisance or produce an actionable injury; while upon
the other hand a party who devotes his premises to a use
that is strictly lawful in itself, that is friitful of great
benefits to the community, that adds materiall,.0 to its wealO
and enhances its commercial impor-ance and prosperity, and
whose motives are good, and intentions laudable even, may
find that by reason of the violation of the rights of those
in the vicinity of his works, from results that are incident
to his business, and that cannot be so far corrected as to
prevent the injury complained of, his works are declared
a nuisance, his business stopped, and himself inv6lved in
financial ruin" But according to Lord Herschell, if I
start a blacksmith's shop in a resident community and by
lighting my fires, and smoking every one out of the pdaee,
without shoeing any horses, I am guilty of maintaining a
nuisance; but if I do shoe horses, then I am not guilty of
maintaining one. This is queer law. If in Keeble v.
ITickeringill the defendant's act was a sufficient distur-
bance of the plaintiff's property right in one case to con-
stitute a nuisancq, why wasn't it in the other? Does a
gun make more noise when it is fired at random into the
atmosphere than when fired at a bird? But it is evident
from the language of C. J. holt that he did not deal with
the case as one of nuisance for he says, (ll Modern, *4,75)
"Suppose the defendant had shot in his own ground, if he had
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occasion to shoot, it would have been one thing, but to
shoot on purpose to damage the planitiff is another thing,
and a wrong. . . . It nust be taken as found upon the
record, but it is found to be done malitos4, and so it
appeared upo-n the evidence" But supposing it were a
nuisance, does Keeble have an action if no right of his has
been infringed? And what right of his has been infringed
in this case? Isn't it the same right from either point
of view? Tt seems to me that it is and that the attempted
distinction is unsound.
In levet's case and Riding v. Smith, the defendant
spoke slanderous wUords of the plaintiff's wife whereby
the plaintiff lost customers &c. Ordinarily a man has no
action for slander spoken of his wife, why did he have it
in this case? Because his customers did not care to come
in contact with his wife, and as she assisted him in his
shop, he thus lost their trade. In the last case Kelly,
C. B., said, "It appears to me that if a man states of an-
other, who is'a trac(er earning his livelihood by dealing
in articles of trade, anything, be it wh-tt it may, the
natural consequence of uttering which would be to injure
his trade and prevent persons resorting to the pace of bus-
iness , and it so leads to loss of trade, it is actionable,
What bearing has Lumley v. Gye, 6 E. & B., 218, on
this question? Many of the judges in Allen v. Flood thought
that the case ea- be supported only on the ground that it
is an interference with a man's trade or right to gain a
livelihood. (34, 50, 60.) Cave, J. says, (34) "It is
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anomalous, because in no other instance in the En lisk law
that I am aware of does a right ex contractu give rise to
a rilrht in rei. In no other case that I know of can two
persons by agreement between themselves create an obligation
binding on all the rest of the world" It seems to me that
the case can be sustained on either ground. I can sec no
good reason for saying that a man has a right to interfere
with a right of another simply because that right arises
out of a contract. I don't think any man has any right
to interfere with another's ri-ht unless he can show some
*legal justificatinn or excuse'
But "it is said that the company were acting within
their legal rights in discharging plaintiffs" "So they wo
were but does that affec + the question of the responsibil-
ity of the persons who caused tham so to act by the means
cust omers
he used? Clearly not. In Garrett V/ Taylor the kfr±xxx
were not obliged to buy any stones; in Tarleton v. M'Gawley
the natives were riot bound to trade with the plaintiff; nor
in the Abbe of Deneshan case were the persons bound to
come to his fair. "The question is, what was the cause
of their wxercising their legal right? The question isn'%
was any legal riruht of the third party injured by the defen-
dany or was any legal right of the plaintiff injured by the
third party, but it is, was any legal right of the plaintiff
injured by the act of the defendant.
It seems to me that the result of these cases is that
"a malicious (without legal justification or excuse) act
done to a man's way of getting a livelihood is actionable7'
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Lord Halsbury made but one mistake when he said, "I/am en-
couraged, however by the consideration, that the adverse
views appear to me to overrule the views of most disting-
uished judges, going back now for certainly 200 years, and
that up to the period when this case reached your lordshpps
House there was a unanimous consensus of opinion. Instead
of saying 200 years he should have said from the time of the
Abbe.of Denesham's case, over five hund-'ed years.
This position is clearly sustained by the remarks of
L. J. bowen in the Mogul case. (See Lord Halsbury in Allen
v. Flood, p. 76, as to their being dicta.). And on appeal
(1892, A. C., 25.) the law as laid down by Sir Hohn Holt
was expressly approved by Lord Field and referred to by
Lord Bramwell. It is also supported by Tempertlon v.
Russell, 1993, 1 Q. B., 715.
Several of the Lords reserved their opinion as to
the result of the case if there had been a combination in-
stead of one. But it is difficult to see how a combin-
ation of men could injure a right which no one has any more
than person could injure it. From whatever direction youA
approach the case one is confronted with the sane proposi-
tion - Is there a right?
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Ameri can cases.
In this couhtry, "life, liberty and propertyl are
protected by the constitution of the United States, and by
the constitutions of the various States. Under this claiuse
"the right to do business" has been held to be property and
protected from legislative acts tending to abridge its free
exercise. People v. Gilson, 109 N. Y., 389. Com. v. perry
155 Mass., 117. Brace ville Coal Co., v. People, 147 111/,
66. Ritchie v. People, 1F5 Ill/, 98. Low v. Rees Printing
Co., 41 Neb., 127. In Braceville Coal Co. v. people, the
court said, "Property in its broader sense, is not the
physical thing which may be the subject of ownership, but
is the right of dominion, possession and power of disposi-
tion which may be acquired over it, and the right of propery
preserved by the constitution, is the right not only to
possess a'd enjoy it, but also to acquire it in any lawful
mode, or by following any lawful industrial pursuit which
the citizen, in the exercise of the liberty guaranteed,
may choose to adopt. Labor is the primary foundation of
all wealth. The property which each one has in his own
laber is the common heritage, and, as an incident to the
right bo acquire other property, the liberty to enter into
contracts by which labor may be employed in such way as the
laborer shall deem most beneficial, and of others to employ
sujclj labor is necessarily included in the constitutional
gvarantyx. In the Frorer case, 141 Ill., 171, we said:
'The privelege of contracting is both a liberty and a prop-
erty right, and if A is denied the right to contract and
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acquire property in the manner which he has heretofore en-
joyed under the law, and which B, C*& D are still allowed
by the law to enjoy, it is clear that he is deprived of
both liberty and property to the extent that he is thus
denied the rig;ht to contract' it may be safely statec, as a
general rule in this country 'that the business of a person,
4.CIF LAWFULLY CONDUCTED? IS A PROPERTY RIGHT' Nashville &C
Ry. Co. v. M'cConnell, 82 Fed., 65, 80/ slaughter House
Cases, 16 Wall., 36, 116. State v. Stewart, 59 Vt., 2 73,
289. CarewLV/ Rutherford, 106 M1ass., 1. Parr v. Trades
Coincil, 53 7:. J. Eq., 101, 112. Shoe Co. v. Saxey, 131
Mo., 223, Lolden v. Hardy, 18 U. S. Sup. Ct. 7ep.? 383.
People v. Barrondess, 61 Hun, 7071, rev's'd, 131 N Y., 649,
(te court adopting the dissenting opinion of jijdge Daniels
in the (leneral-Term.) In this case Judge Daniels said? "A
loss resulting from the suspension or interruption of the
business would necessa-ily be an injury to property.
Business is property, as much so as the articles themselves
which are included in its transactions7 The question is
how far have the courts recognized this property right in
tie boycott cases? t
I think it may be safely stated that wherever the
dottftse of Lumley v. Rye has been passed upon in this coun-
try it has been approved, except in Cal., Mo.) and Ky.
Boyson v- Thorn, 98 Cal., 578. Chambers V/ Baldwin, 91
Ky., 121. Boulier v. Macauley, 91 Ky/, 235. Sand &
Gravel Co. v. Conmmission Co., 138 11o., 439.
Of the cases that deal with the other phases of the
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subject Walker V. Cronin, 107 Mass., 555, is an early and
well considered case. The plaintirf was a manufacturer
of shoes. The first count of the declaralton alleged that
the defendant " unlawfully and without justifiable cause
molest, obstruct and hinder the plaintiffs, from carrying
oX. said business, with the tnlawful purpose of preventing
t e plaintiffs from varrying on their said business, and
willfully persuaded and induced a large number of persons,
(1) who were in the employment of the plaintirfs . . . and
(2) others who were about to enter 6he employment of the
plaintiffs'. It will be noticed that in one case t~ie em-
ployes were 'ot bound to remain and in the oth er they were
not bound to become employes. Wells, J., said:- "This
sets forth sufficiently (1) intentional and wilful acts (2)
calculated to. cause damage to the plaintiff in their lawful
business, (3) done with the unlawful purpose to cause shch
damage and loss, without right or justifiable caiuse on
the part.,of _he defendant, (which constitutes malice,) and
(4) actual damage and loss resulting: "Every one has the
right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enter-
prise, industry, skill and credit. Be has no right to
be protected against competition; but he has a right to be
free from malicious and wanton interference, disturbance or
annoyanve. If disturbance or loss comes as a result of
competition, o- the exercise of like rights by others, it
is damnum, absque injuria, unless some superior right by
contract or otherwise is interfered with. But if it comes
from the merely wanton or malicious act of others, without
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the justification of competition or the service of any in-
terest or lawful pirpose, it then stands upon a different
footing, and falls within the principle of the authorities
first referred too"
The second and third counts alleged that defend nt
induced certain workmen to break existing cowttracts &c. The
opinion ends thus, "Upon careful consideration of the au-
thorities, as well as the principles involved, we are of
opinion tT.t a legal cause of action is sufficiently stated
in each of the three counts of tke declaration" The case
contains an elaborate review of the English au4>orities
and the cases where force &c. were used are cited to sus-
tain the principle involved.
In Hughes v. McDonough, 43 N. J. L., 459, the plain-
tiff was a blacksmith. The defend, ant, "maliciously intend#
ing to injure the plaintiff in his trade" loosened a shoe
which plai.tiff had recentl7 --it on t; e mare of one Van
Ripper and also drove a nail in the mare's hoof, intending
to "'-us deprive the pAaintiff of the patronage of the said
Van Ripper" It was Lneld actionable. Beasley, C. J.,
said, "T'he act had a two fold injurious aspect: it was cal-
culated to injure both Van Ripper and the vpllainti{'f; and
as each was directly damnified, I can perceive no reason
why each could not repair his losses by an action'
In Van Horn v. Van Horn, 52 N. J. L., 284, s.c., 56
N J. L. 8/9', the defendantsl ,,by means of corrupt, fraud-
ulent and deceitful max~x representations and statements as
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to the rersonal and business character and s~anding of the
plaintiff" induc:-.d the firm from which shh bought to refuse
to sell to her and to recall goods already sent her. "If
the consignors refuse to send the goods to her, it does not
appear that she vould have any remedy against them. They
could send or recall them at pleasure. The complaint here
is, t-at .he goods in the plaintiffs possession were re-
called, and her advantageous arrangement for credit with
the consignors ended, by the .fraudu lent and malicious act
of the defendant. . . . The diffeence between this act
tion and slander, is well sta'ed in Riding v. Smith, 1,L. R,
Ex. D., 91, where a slander against the wife was charged as
having injucred the husband's business. Her name was strik-
en from the record, as a joint plaintiff, and the action
was allowed to proceed by the husan, d , t-d,', carry-
ing on business, founded on an act done by the defendant
which led to loss of trade and custom by the pdaintiff.
It was maintainable on the ground that the injury to the
plaintiff's b,,usiness wa.82 the natural consequence of the W
words spoken, which would preventpersons resorting to the
plaintiff's shop" See also, Delz v. winifree, 80 Tex.,
400. Jackson V. Stanfield, 137 Lnd., 592. Barr v. EssexW
Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq., 101. Veglehan v-. Guntner,
167 Mass. 92. Olive v. Van Patten, 7 Tex. Civ. APP.J 630
Let us examine the American cases where the facts are
similar to Allen v. Flood, i. e. X gets A to break a con-
tract with B, the contract being one terminable at the will
ofreither party. The earliest case issSalter v. Howard,
43 Ga., 601, Tn this case the defendant enticed away
70.
certain laborers from the plaintiff. The court said, "The
fact that these servants were under employment by H. (pl'ff)
and in performance of such agreement, were upon his place
at work, constituted as to third parties, such a relation-
ship of master und servant as protected them from being
interfered with or enticed to leave lis plantation. We
do not hold that it is necessary to sustain this action,
that there must be a written contract, or that any third pat.
party can take advantage of formal defects in one if wri.tt en.
If iunde- employment the servants are at work, any person
intruding upon the rights of the master by enticing them
away, is liable in an action of damages, and we therefore
concur with the court in 1-efusing a new trial sought upon
this ground" In the next case, Noice v. Brown, 39 N. J. L,
569, the seco-d coujnt was for enticing awaysa servant at
willP.O It wa said, "It is well settled that a persor~who,
knowing the premises, entice's anotherv to break an existing
contract of service," is liable 'o an action for the damages
which ensue to the employer. Whether an action will lie
where there is no binding co.,tract to continue in service
is, perliaps, not so clear, but I think it may be maintained
both upon reason and authority, where it is merely a sub-
sisting service at will. Wherei~the service iv merely at
will, all the liabilities and rights existing between master
and servant attach to the relation. . . . In such service
like a tenancy at will, the relatirn must be ended in some
way, before the rightIts of the master can be lost:" By the
u'nwarrantable interference of a third party, the employer
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is deprived of what he otherwise might have retained"
Ix Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla., 206, is a well-con-
sidered case and is on all fours with Allen v. Flood, for
in this case it was the employer who was induced to break
a contract at will and discharge the plaintiff. It was
held actionable, the court daying, "From the authorites
referred to in the last preceeding paragraph, and upon prin-
ciple, it is apparent that neither the fact that the term
of service interrupted is not for a fixed period nor the
fact that therE is not a ri ht of action against the person
who is induced or influenced to terminate the service or to
refuse to perform his agreement, is of itself not a bar to
an action against the third persnn maliciously and wanton-
ly procuring the termination of or a refusal to perform the
agreement. It is the legal right of the party to such
agreement to terminate it or refuse to perform it, and in
so doing he violates no right of the other party to it, but
so long as the -former is willing and veady to per-form ±±,
it is not the legal right, but is a wrong on the part of a
third party to maliciously and wantonly procire the former
to terminate or refuse to perform it. such wanton and mal-
icious interference for tibe mere purpose of injuring another
is not the exercise of a legal riluht. Such other person
who is in employment by which he is ea-ning a living or
otherwise enjoying the fruits and advantages of his industry
or enterprise or skill, has a right to pursue such employ-
ment undisturbed by mere malicious or wanton interference
or annoyance. Every one has a perfect right to protect
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or advance his business if in Em doing so he infringes no
superior legal right of another"
This statement of the law is quoted with approval in
Lucke v. Cutter's &c Trimmer's Assembly, 77 Md., 396, and
Perkins v. Pendleton, 90 Me., 166,
two cases involving the same principle. See, old Dominion
Steamship Co. v. cKenna, 30 Fed., 48, and Lally v. Cantwell
30 Mo. App., 524. I have been able to find ro American
case involving facts simila o to Allen v. Flood where the
principle has been denied.
What is the result of all these cases? Let us re-
turn for a moment Ao our old friend tUnlawful! I think we
can now give a more accurate definition of the word. Why
is an act unlawful? Why has A no right to assault or im-
prison 1? Does it depend on the intrisic nature of the
act or does it depend on the fact that some right of B's has
been invaded? I think it depends on the latter, in the one
case his right of personal liberty has been interfered with
and in the other that ofrpersonal security. Isn't, there
fore, an unlawful act one that invades the right of another
and for which 'here is no legal justificationior excuse?
Some one may say that oxi-e- would be liable for naarly all of
his acts, bult this is not so. We all know that many acts
prima facie unlawful may be justified and then what was un-
lawful becomes lawful. One can justify an assault, a libel
and nearly every tort. It strikes me that the courts have
lost a great deal of valyable time in discussing unlawful
meansthat might 'ave been saved if the-/ had looked to see
if any legal right of the plainti"f had been invaded and
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then. inquired whether there was any excuse for that invasion.
I wonder what criterion of unlawful acts the colrts used int
the first ca,-se of assault K, imprisonment &c. If 4hey
had argued accovding to the modern method how could it
ever have been determined that these acts were unlawful.
What means had they for determining tha+ the acts were un-
lawful? It strikes me that these courts must have at
least felt, if they did not say, that some right of the
plaintiff had been invaded and therefore the acts were un-
lawful. I imagine that our ancient lawyers would have
been somewhat mistified by the modern idea of an unlawful
act. Suppose the first case for false imprisonment had
been one where the defendant, knowing that the plaintiff
was in his (def't) house, had locked the doors and barred
the windows and the gone away and left the plaintiff to
get'out as best he might. Now the astute lawyer for the
defense says, "Your honor, my client ? as done nothing he
hadn't a legal right to do, he had a right to lock up his
own house and bar the windows if he saw fit"; and his honor
remarks, "Why that is so, the plaintiff here has no right,
for the defend &nt has done -,othing that he couldn't legally
do" Isn't that a remarkable proposition? But this is
t ie modern method of getting at an unlawful act. It is
certainly wonderful.
As I understand the situation, it is 1,,ractically this:
A man has a right to gain a livelihood, therefore any inter-
ference wil-h that right is unlawful, unless some excuse or
jistifiation is shown. The whole trouble lies in looking
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at the cause and not at the effect. If the effect is an
injury to a right, then there is an action, whether the caus
be primarily lawful or unlawful, unless some excuse or
justification can be shown.
A very interesting question presents itself here, i.
e., whereAthe burden of proof lie? In the ordinary action
of tort (assault, libel, &c.) the plaintiff need only prove
the wrong and the defendant must Prove the justification.
In the case f.f a nuisance the burden is o the plaintiff to
prove the nuisance. Wood on Nuisances, 2 Ed., 982. The
rule governing the burden of proof in contributory negli-
gence furnishes another example where the plaintiff must go
further than proving the simple w ong, he must at least
prove the absence of some of the grounds of jistification.
In other words one might say that in some torts the courts
will presume that the act wasn't justified and the burden
is on the defendmt to prove that it was; whil in 6thers.,at
least some of the grounds of ,ustification do exist and the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove their absence. In
which class does the action for a wrong done to the right
to gain a livelihood, tall? The question presented itself
to me so late that I have been unable to make a careful
study of the cases on this point and therefore I only sug-
gest it.
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GROUNDS OF JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE.
In the preceeding pages I haven't attempted to show
nor did I inteind to indicate anx of the times when an inter-
ference with the right to gain a livelihood would be justi-
fied. I did not analyze the ces for that purpose. I
simply analyzed them for the purpose of proving that there
was such a right and for no otler. We muJst now consider
what tne law will KxNx±xx say is 'a lawful justification
and excuse' for meddling with another's ri' ht to gain a live-
lihood. It is apparent that if all men have a right to
gain a livelihood, that frequently, when two or more persons
a" legitimately exercising this right, thea will clash and
each must give way to the o'her in some degree. Thus we
can see that f.here will be certain injuries which the law
must necessarily excuse.
Before entering upon the discussion we should notice
the general principles governing the question. A boycott
is a combination and a civil action in relation thereto,is
an action on the case in the nature of conspiracy. There
is no action for the mere combination or conspi--acy, but
something must be done resulting in damage to the plaintiff.
Enc. of P1. & Pr.,, 739, n. 3. The allegation of conspir-
acy is mere surplusage, acting merely as a matter of agrava-
tion. Id. Further "a conspiracy cannot be made the sub-
ject of a civil action, although damage result, unless some-
thing is done which without the conspiracy would give a rich
of action. In other words an act which if done b, one
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alone constitutes no groundof action cannot be made the
ground of auch action by alleging it to have been done by
and through a conspiracy of severul; that 'he true test as
whether such action will lie is whether or not tht act ac-
complished after the conspiracy has been formed is itself
actionable, , Delz v. Winifree. Bohn Hfg. Co. v. Hollis.
Boston V. Simmons. Kimball v. Harmon. I acauley v. Tier-
J/ * / i .. //
ney.A The only use of the allegation of conspiracy is that
it is important to prove it in order to get judgment against
all the defendants, but if the plaintiff can only show that
one of the defend 'nts was concerned in the act he may still
have judgment against him. Enc. of Pl/ & Pr 7A 73 9 , n. 5.
In the Oxley Stave Co. case the court says? "We are not able
to concede, however, that it is always the case that what
one person amy do without rendering himself liable to an
action many persons may enter into a combination to do. It
has been held in several well considered cases that the law
will sometimes take cognizance of acts done by a combination
which would not give rise to a cau se of action if committed
by a single individual, since there is a powerx in numbers,
acting in concert, to inflict injury, which does not reside
in persons acting separately" "Steamship Co. v. McGregor,
1892 App. Cas., 24,25; i(., 23 Q. B. D., 598, 616: Ar~Tur
v. Oakes, 11 C. C. A., 209, 63 Fed., 310, 3r1; and State v.
Glidden, 55 Conn., .46" are cited as the 'well-considered
cases' supporting this statement. So far as the first
case is concerned it is simply necessary to state that no
one was held liable for anything in that case. Judge Thay-
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er evidently r'ers to the dicta of Bowen, L.J., at p. 6a
of the .. D. The discssionH_'_
reprtof the case in 23 'B
referred to in Arthur v. Oakes begins on p. 321 and Aon p.
324 with the paragraph alr-eady quoted(on p. /3 beginning,
"it seems entilely clear"- The case does not sustaiy the
proposition suted by Judge KThayer. State v. Glidden
is more dificult to explain on account of the report. The
defendants demrred to the indictment. The demurrer was
overruled and the defendantsAtried and convicted. "The
evidence, which was given in full in the findings, is omit-
ted", in the report. An examination of the indictment
shows tha acts were charged that were clearly sufficient
and others tha. were insufficient to constitute an offense.
It is impossible to tell what was proven. But there are
statement in the Opinion which sustain the contention of
Judge Thayer. (p.74.) However I think the decission real-
ly went on the grounds that il was a combination to do a
lawful act by unlawful means. (p. 75 - 78.)
The use of the word 'malicious' in this connection
has cause( a -reat deal of trouble but its proper applica-
tion is well explained by Bowen, L.J., in the Mogul case.
He says, "Now, intentionally to do that which is calculated
in the ordinary course of events to damage , end which does,
in fact, damage another in that otlhers person,ax property
or trade, is actionable if done without just cause or ex-
cuse. Such intenhional action when done without just cause
or excuse is what the law calls 'malicious' wrong. (See
Bromage V. Prosser, 4 B. & C , 247; Capital & Counties Bank
v. Fenty, pe_rLord Blackburn.)" Of course the courts
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might say, we will allow all acts to be justified excert
those that are prompted by personal malice or spite, but
they hamen't drawn the line there. See, Mooer's V.
Bricklayers Union? 23 Wk. L. Bull., 48.
Keeping these principles in riind ve can proceed with
our investigation.
The bovndries of legal jostification and excuse in
these cases have not as yet been clearly defined. The sim-
plest case is this;- oneperson wishing to harm X, refuses to
have anu business relati,-ns with him. Does X have an ac-
tion? The answer Is clearly, No. "A person has an abso-
lute ,." .... ... . .. L .;..iiess relations with any
person whomsoever-, whether the refusal is based upon reason
or the result of whim, caprice, prejudice, or malice.' Delz
v. Winifree. Carew v. Rutherford. This must necessarily
be so, otherwise there would be no personal freedom.
If one person may refuse to deal wi.- h X, It follows that
seVeral may combineAtogether a-nd refuse. This is the case
of the Bohn Mfg. Co.'v. Hollis. In this case retailers
in lumber agreed not to buy of any wholsaler who sold to
others than regular dealers. The plaintiff (a wholesaler)
violated this provision and the retailers refused to buy
of him. It was held, and properly, that i ere wa.3 xo
action. In this case "i' will be observed that defendants
were not proposing to send notices to any one but,members
of the associatioi."
Brewster v. Miller, 41 S. W., 301, a late Kentucky
casey supports the same proposition. In this case the un-
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dertakers of Louisville agreed to refuse their services to
any one who had failed to pay :Kx xExxixxxx a bill for
former services. It was held that the plaintiff, who had
fallen under this ban, had no cause of action. The court
said, "One has the right to decline to enter into a business
undertaking
XK±H±±XX with anyone. The law does not impose such an ob-
ligation upon any one. This being trije, any number of
persons can enter into an agreement by which they can de-
cline to assume business relations with or to enter into
any contract with one or more persons. If Brewster was
indebted to Miller's Sons, then they had the right to de-
cline to give him ani opporlunity to increase his indebted-
ness or refuse to furnish material for the burial of bis
wife, unless he paid the claim which Miller's Sons asserted
against him. As those who are members of the Funeral
Director's Association, for a good reason,. or for no reason,
bu r i a 1
had the right to decline to render services or furnish"ma-
terial, and, if they saw proper, to decline to render ser-
vices because Miller's Sons asserted a claim against Brews-
ter, their refusal creates no legal liability against them.
It is immaterial, so far as Brewster is concerned, as to
what reasons may have influenced them to decline employment,
or to refuse to furnish the burial material which he desir-
ed. Miller's Sons might have asserted a claim against
Brewster which had foundation in neither morals or law, yet
if the members of the association, other than Miller's Sons
chose to be influenced by it, and to decline the employ-
ment &c., B'ewster has no cause of action against them"
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(See Schulten v. Brewing Co., 96 1(y., 224.)
Curran v. Galen,2 misc., 553, s.c. 152 N. Y., 33, is
a peculiar case. It seems that the Ale Brewer's Associa-
tion of Roghester had agreea with defendants that all its
employes "shall be members of the Brewerti Workingmen's
Local Assembly, 1796, Knights of Labor, ant that no employe
should work for a longer period than four weeks without
becoming a member" Plaintiff, not being a member, was
discharged. He brought anlaction agains4 the members of
the labor union who set up this agreement as a defense.
The special Term sustained a demurrer to the answer and the
Court of Appeals affirmad the decision. There is no alle-
gation that the contract was not prefectly voluntary on the
Art of he Brewer's Association. So fa, as appearsfVom
the report of the case it would seem that it should be con-
trolled by the principle of the Bohn case. The court
seems to rest its decision on the ground that the contract
was in restraint of trade, therefore void and no defense to
the action. In a 'Per Criam' opinion the court said,
"Public policy and the interests of society favor the ut-
most freedom in the citizen to purshai his lawful trade
or calling, and if the purpose of an organization or combin-
ation of workingmen be to hamper, or to restrict that free-
dom, and, through con tracts or arrangements with employers,
to coerce other workingmen to become members of the organ-
ization and to come under its rules and conditions, under
the penalty of the loss of their position, and of depriva-
tion of employment, then that purpose seems clearly unlaw-
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ful and militates against' the spirit of our government and
the nature of our institutions%- The efectuation of such
a purpose woild conflict with that principle of public poli-
cy Which prohibits monopolies and exclusive priveleges. It
would tend to deprive the prblic of the services of man in
useful employments and capacities" In this view of the
case all the parties to the illegal combination would be
liable, the Brewer's Association as well a- the labor Union.
But as I understand the law a contract in restraint of tra&
is simply unenforceable between the parties ahd a third per-
son who suffers thereby has no cause of acti n simply be-
cause the ontract is in restraint of trade. "No case can
be found in which it was ever held that, at common law, a
contract or agreement in general restraint of trade was ac-
tionable at the instance of thira parties, or would consti-
tute the foundation for such an action. The courts some-
times call such contracts 'unlawful' or 'illegal' but in
every instance it will be found that these terms were used
in the sense, merely, of 'void' or 'unenforceable' as be-
tween the parties; the law considering the disadvantages
so imposed upon the contract a0sufficient protection to the
public. Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 23 Q. B. D.,598;
1892 App. eas., 25" 11itchell, J., in the Bohn Mfgr. Co.
case. See, also, Continental Ins. eo/, 9. Underwriters,
67 Fed., 310, and U. S. v. Addystone Pipe & Steel Co/, 85
Fed., 271, 279. This is the first exception.
The second case may be illustrated as follows:-
suppose thatin the Bohn case the wholsalers had refused to
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sell to a non-regular dealer, bqcause of this rule of the
retailers, would this non-regualr dealer have had an action
against the retailers? Let us notice bbrefully the rela-
tion between the parties to this combination. We have threi
Ist. the' party threatening, 2nd. the party threatened, and
3rd. the party intended to be injured. It is clear that
under the first exception, the 3rd party could not have an
action against the second, nor the second against the first.
The question is, can he 3rd party have an action against
the 1st? and if so, when? It must be observed that in
t,'e first case, where ax combination refuses to deal with
X, that X isireally "he third party? for each e4 of the
combination must have used some effort to obtain the consent
ofq~the others to join the combination. Consequently we
must first notice what means may be used in forming this
combination. If only honest and peaceable persuasion and
argument arerused to obtain +he consent to jtin this com-
bination, then there is n:o action. Cote v. Murphy, 159
Pa. St., 420; Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis; and U. S. v. Kane,
23 Fed., 748, see quotation ofi p. . But suppose
a man refuse to be influenced by honest and peacaatle persu-
asion and argument, can you go any furhter or use other
means to obtain his consent? Of course this gives us the
same state of affairs as was just suggested in the modifica-
tion to the Bohn case, or the three party arrangement.
There are two situations that may exist which seem to con-
trol this case. First, there may be competition between
the first and thi-d aprties, and second, thienre may be no
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competition between them.
What do we mean by competition? Webster defines it
as "the act of seeking, or endeavoring to gain, what another
is endeavoring to gain at the same time" There ma-, be
competition in trade, betweon rival traders. Jackson Y.
Stabfield, 137 Ind., 592. There may be competition in
labor between labor, between rival laborers. Allen v. f
Flood. And lastly, there may be competition between capi-
tal and labor. xx~kxxxx±txAxzN~ Y X22 xMdx~xf2xx
Veglehan v. G~untner, 167 Mass., 92. It is competition,
pu-e and simple, in each case, and if "all men are created
Equal", the laborer and the trader are entitled to the same
protection in their competition and no greater restraints
should be imposed on the one thah on the other.
First let us consider the cases where there is no
competition and see just what they decide. Can the first
party use more than persuasion and argument in trying to
induce the second party not to deal with the fbktud? It is
well settledathat if fraud, force, threats, intimidation,
coercion, libellous sta'-ements or other uilawful means are
used an action lies. Garrett v. Taylot. Levet's case.
Keeble v. Hickeringill. Ibbotson v.Peat. Tarleton v.
M'Gawley. Evans v. Walton. Guntner v. Astor. Hughes
v. McDonough. Van Horn v. Van HorN. Blumenthal v. Shaw.
Noice v. Brown. But suppose means are used which,
considered in the abstract, are not unlawful, does an acti n
lie? For instance if A says to B, if you trade with X I
won't trade with you. In Temperton V Russell, ti-e membesr
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of a trade union threatened to withdraw from the employment
of any person who dealt with plaintiff. In Chipley v.
Atkinson, the defendant threatened that he woild not build
a side track for the second party if he retained plaintiff
in his employment. (He wasn't bound to butid the track.)
In Int. Nat. Fy. Co. v. Greenwood, the defendant threaten-
ed to discharge employes if they dealt with plaintiff. In
Connell v. Stalker, the plaintiff was treasurer of a labor
union and refused to give up certain books oyi an illegal
demand made by the union. The union men who were employed
with him, threatened to quit if plaintiff remained and he
was discharged. In none c(f these cases, except possibly
Temperton wy. Russell, was there any pretence of competition
bet ;een the first and thtrd parties, and it is clear U1:t
the act threatened was not in itself unlawful, but it was
held that there was an action. I thi ,ik that it may be
said that in the eases ,'here there is no competition nothing
niore than argument and persuasion can be used to influence
the second party. 7her- are several eases which were
heard on demurrer but they help us none as to the facts.
,ytalker v. Cronin. Dannerburg v. Ashley. Perkins v.
Pendleton. Delz v. 7'inifree. In the last case the alle-
ration is "that without justifiable cause and unlawfully,
and with the malicious intent to molest, obstruct, hinder
and orevent the plaintiff from carrying on his business" &c.
The court says "Plaintiffs' petiltion goes further than to
chrge that each of tJ e defend :nts refused to sell to him.
It charges that they not only did that, but that they indu-!-
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ed a third person +-o refuse to sell to him' It does not
appear what means were tised to induce the third Tperson but
if the word 'induced' only includes arguients and persua-
sions then I think the case t,-ong under the rule governing
the first ex,.eption. It cannot be otherwisel for in this
very case there were several defend-nts and some one of
them must have 'induced' the others - the agreement could
hardly have been spontaneous - and surely the court does not
mean to say that any one bf the defend±nts would be liable
for 'inducing' some other defendant. It seems to me that
this construction of the case reduces it to an absujrdity.
We now come to the cases where A-here is cmmpetition
between the first and third party. Of course the ge eral
rule is that "if disturbance or loss comes fxrom :k as a
result of competition of tlie exercise of like rights by
others, it is damnum absque injuria, unless some superion
right by contract or otherwise is interfered with.' Walker
v. Cronin. "The reason is . that free competition is
worth mo-e to society than it costs, and that on this groundb
the infliction of the damage is privileged" The principle
is found in the schoolmaster's case, 11 H. IV, 47, and also
in the Miller's case, 22 H. VI. 14. (See Vinier's Abr.,
Actions on the Case, N. c., 11, 12, 13, 14, & 15.) The
rule is admirably stated in Macauley v. mierney, 33 Atl,",l,
where the court says, " It is doubtless true, speaking gen-
erally, that no one, has a right intentionally to do an act
with the irtent to injure another in Vis business. Injury,
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however, in its legal, sense, means damage resulting from a
violation of a legal right. It is this viola+ion of a
legal right which renders the act wrongful in the eye of the
law, and makes it actionable. If, therefore, there is
a ljgal excuise for the act, it is not wrongful, even though
damage may result from its performance. The cause and
excuse for the sending of the notices, it is evident, was
a selfish desire of the part of the members of the e4e
association to rid themselves of the competition of those
not members, with a view to increasing the profits of their
own business. The qvestion then resolves itself into this:
Was the desire to free themselves from competition, a suffi-
cient exciise,Mix in legal contemplation, for the sending of
t:e notices? We think the uestion must receive an affirm-
ative answer. Competition, it has been said, is the life
of trade. Every act done by a trader for the purpose
of diverting t-ad]e from a rival, and attracting it to him-
self, is an act intentionally done, and, in so far, as it
is successful, to the injury of the rival in his business,
since to that extent it lessens his gains and profits. To
hold such an act illega. and wrongful would be to stifle
competitirn. Trade should be free and unrestricted; and
hence every trader is left to conduct his business in his
own way, and cannot .re held accountable to a rival who
suffers a loss of profit by anything he may do, so long as
the methods he employs are not of the class of which fraud,
misrepreaentation, coercion, obstructiom, or molestation of
the rival or his servants or workmen, and the procurement
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of a breach of contractual relations, are instances" The
coutts hhve generally recognized the rule but differ in the!
application of it to the particular case in hand. It is
on this ground that Allen v. Flood may be sustained. Lord
Shand puts his judgment squarely upon this ground, he says,
"-he case was one of competition in labor, which, in my
opinion, is in al essentials analogous to competition in
trade, and to which, the same principles must apply.
Although it is no doubt true that the Plaintiffs were en-
titled to pu.sue their trade as workmen 'without hindrance',
their right to do so was qualified by an equal rilht, and
indeed the same right, on the part of the other workmen.
The hindrance must not be of an unlawful character. It
must not beK by an unlawful action. Amongst the rights of
all workmen is the right of competition. In like manner
and to the same extent as a workman has a right to pursue
his work or labor without hindrance, q trader h .s a right
to trade without hindrance. That right is subject to the
right of others to trade also, and to subject him to com-
petition whici is in itself lawful, and which cannot be
complained of where no unlawful means xR xxic . . . have
been employed. The matter has been settled in so far as
competition in trade is concerned by the judgment of this
House in the Mogul Steamship Co/ case. I can see no reason
for saying that a different principle should apply to com-
petition in labor. In the course of such competition, and
with a view to secure Im kimxmRf an advantage to himself, I
can find no reason, for saying that a workman is not within
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legal
his"rights in resolving that he will decline to work in the
same employment with certain other persons, and in intimat-
ing that resolution to his employer" (See remarks of
Hawkins, J., p. 23; Cave, J., p. 37, and Lord Herschell,
pp. 119, 140-141.)
However it is evident there must be a limit to allow-
able competition. The curts are not at all agreed as to
just where this limit is. Of course it may be stated that
honest peaceable -ersuasion and argument may be used by A
to get others to deal with him and that he may offer better
terms than any one else. Pogul case.) It is also settled
that if "fraud, misrepresetation, intimidation, coercion,
obstruction, molestation or other utlawful means"are used
e. ThEN THE PRIVELEGE IS DESTROYED/ mACAULEY V,/ TIERNEY/
ixxkxdkxa b 1x:crxxnx±x t kxxx laxs :xcxxasx.. Mogul
case. Bohn Mfgr. Co. case/ Robinson v. Land Ass'n.
But what is the result between these two extremes?
This is the debatable ground in this class of cases.
In Jackson v. Stanfield, "The retail Lumber Dealer's
Ass'n'. agreed not to patronize any wholsaler who sold to
consumers and brokers. The retailers whre held liable in
an action by a broker to whom a wholsaler had refused to
sell on account of this rule of the retailers. This case
seems to go principally on the same ground as Curran v.
Galen, (ante, p. 80) and that 4here were 'threats and in-
timidations'. In Olive v. Van Patten tbe facts were
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similar to those of the last case. The decision seems to
go squa-ely on the ground of interference. The court says,
"Plaintiffs had the right to sell at wholesale or retail, or
both, to the retail dealer and to the actual consumer, and
defendants had the same right, as well as the ri-h to so-
licit and secure trade from plaintiff's customers by under-
selling them. This would be legitimate. They could do
this, and would ot be responsible for the injurious con-
sequences to the plaintiff's business; but they could not,
without wome legal purpose directly serving their own busi-
ness, maliciously induce third persons not to trade with
I)laintiffs and so injure the~m:, In Hopkins v. Oxley Stave
Co., the employes of plaintiff, who were members of the
defendant labor union, became dissatisfied because of the
introduction of labor saving machinery, which resulted in
the discharge of many and threatened a cut in the wages of
the rest, and struck. The defendants notified the pa,,kers
of meat that if they used any of the machine made barrels
&c. made by Plaintiff, that defendants' labor union and oth-
er labor unions would refuse to buy their goods. The
defendants were held liable because "those who were engaged
in the conspiracy intended to excite the fears of all per-
sons who were engaged in making barrels, or who handled
commoditieA packed in barrels, that, if they did not obey
the orders of the associated labor organizations, they would
incur the active hostility of those associations, suffer a
great financial loss, and possibly run the risk of sustain-
ing, some personal injiry' Barr Y. Trades Coujncil, in-
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volves the same state of facts except that it ,,,'as a printing
office instead of a coopering plant. In regard to compe-
tition the court said, (p. 124) "1 see no similarity in the
business of the parties. That bf the complainant is the
publisher of a ne spaper. !hembers of the typographical
union and stereotypers' and pressmens' union are skilled
workmen, whose services might be employed in such business,
but they are ':ot carrying on any enterprise in competition
that If this isn't competition between
with"of the oomplainant7'*
capita-Tn-Jabor, what is?---The employer seeking to in-
troduce new conditions that will affect the wages of the
working men, and 'the employes resisting. Would the court
have us believe that thate can be no competition between
capital and labor. Theft the; e can JIhe competition only
between traders or between laborers. According to this
theory the Brewer's Ass'n. should have been held liable in
Cu-ran v. Galei; and the Labor Union not liable, for the
plaintiff and the labor inion were both engaged in the same
enterprise (seeking for work) and the Brewer's Ass'n and
the plaintiff were not/ (one owned the brewery and the other
worked in it.) I am very much afraid that I don't know
just what competifion means. Does it necessarily follow
that persoens must be engaged in the same 'enterprise' that
there may be competition? But if this proposition is true,
are not the pa-ties to this controversy engaged in the same
nterprise'? One is seeking to maintain his wages and
hours of labor by resisting the use of labor saving machin-
ery and t1he other to reduce wages and hours of labor by
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using this machinery. Isn'T this competition? How-
ever, the decision seems to go on the ground that "tere can
be no -reas(;nable dispute th- the whole proceeding or boy-
cott in this controversy is to force Mr. Barr, by fear of
loss -o bu__isiness, to conduct that iusiness, not according
to his own judgment, but in accordance with the determin-
ation of the typographical union, and, so far as he is con-
cerned, it is an attempt to intimidate and coerce" In
Lucke v. Cutters & Trimmers, the defendants (tailors) were
members of a labor union. The defeddant was a tailor and
not a member of the union. The defendants secured his
discharge by threatening to withdraw their patroaage from
the employed. The court seems to have held that there was
no competition in this case for it is said "the testimony
in this :.ase assigns no other motive, (to procure plaintiffs
discharge) and there is not the slightest intimation from
any source that there is any." Yet it appears that there
were "many union men ou• of employment" In Steamship
Co. v. McKenna, there was a strike of longshoremen and
defendants, dffiuers of the labor union, "endeavored to stop
all dealing of other lersons wit.1 the plaintiff, by wending
threatening notices or messages to its various customers
and patrons . . . designed to intimidate them from having
any dealing -ith it, through threats of loss and expenxe
in case they dealt with plantiff. . .. and various per-
sons were deterred from dealing with the plaintiff in conse-
quence of sujch intimidations" The court says they did this
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"without any legal justifici.tion, . . a mere dis-
pute about wages, the merits of which are not stated,
not being any legal justification" If a dispulte hbout
w<lgr' b 4 33a employer and employe isn't competition
and -t le-al justifica-4 on then I am unable to imagine
what Ynar be.
These are the case apparently holding that more than
argument and persuasion cannot be uised in cases of ommpe-
tition. A great deal was said in the cases about 'threats
and intiinida i m1.s' , "bvt in law as well as mathcrx tLes, it
simplifies things very mvsh to reduce them to their lowest
terms", and when th/is is done we find that the only threat
was to terrain from having business intercourse with those
who dealt wih plaintiff.
Let us look ut the cases on the other side of the
qiestien. In the Mogul case the defendants, besides offer-
inglower rates, "refused to accept cargoes from shippers
except upon the terms that the shippers shoiid not ship an,
cargoes by the plaintiff's steamers " they also prevented
persons who were acting as their agents from acting as the
agent of the plaintijf. But the acts were held within
justifiable competition. In Gauthier v. Perrault, 6 Que.
(Q. B.) 65, the de:'endants, mambers of a trade union,
threatened to strike if plaintiff was not discharged.
Plaintiff was a member of another union. The, did quit
and when plaintiff was discharged they resumed work. The
court held that the case was governed by the Mogul case,
saying, "Certaines remarqiles des Lords du conseil prive
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peuvent s'appliquer a la presente cause. Ansi Lord Hals-
bury remarq;e que la competitirn, dans le 7ut de chasser un
rival, est chose permis dans le commerce" In Clemmitt
v. Watson, 14 Ind. App., 38, the facts were the same as the
last case. A judgment in favor of the plaintiff was rever-
sed becau ,e the various charges of the court "do not require
t~he existance of malice, threa's, intimidation or violence.
Under these instructions nothing more is neces:iary
than a mere agreement among themselves to quit if appellee
(pl'2lf) was -'etained and a quitting upon the employers re-
fusal to disebarge."' In Cont. Ins. Co. v. Underwriters,
the defen:.;dant board of indervlriters entered into a combin-
aticn to regulate insurance rates &c. and agreed to have no
intercourse withnon-msmbers nor to employ any agent who re-
presented u non-memjer, and threatened t e assiir4ds of
plaintiff (a non-member) "with a boycott in case they con-
tinue their patronage of plaintiff" Judge McKenna held
that this did not exceed the bounds of allowable competition.
In Maaauley v. Tierney the National Ass'n of Master Plumbers
agreed to withdraw their patronage from any dealer selling
supplies .o others 'han master plumbers. This was held to
be allowable coripetition. (See quotation p. 85.) Cote
v. Murphy and Buchanan v. Keer grer out of the same trouible.
In these cases the employes of the various trade inions,
"demanded an eight Iour day, with no -eduction in wages'
The employers refussed to grant this demand and the employ-
es strock. The defendants, aertaJ.n of t'e employers,
agreed not to furnis.-h material to any one w',o granted the
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requast. The plaintiff granted the request and the defen-
dants refused to supply him with any material and wrote to
a dealer who sol. to plaintiff, that "it would be to his
advantage to discontinue" supplying plaintiff with material.
This dealer therefore refused to supply plainti.ff with any
more material. It was held that there was no cause of ac-
tion. The court in Cote v. Murphy saying, "The combina-
tion of the employers then, was not to interfere with the
price of labor as determined by the common law theory, but
to defend themselves against a demand made altogether re-
gardless of the price, as regulated by the supply, . . .
Nor does the fact that the appellee was not a workman or a
member of any of the unions of workmen, put him in any bet-
ter attitude than if he were. He undertook for his own
profit to aid the cause of t-1e workmen; his right so to do
was unquestionable,. But, if the employers by a lawful
combination could limit his ability so to do, they did not
make thamselves answerable in damages to him for t?.e con-
sequences of a lawful act! In discussing threats &c., the
court said, "The threats referred to, although they are
usually termed threats, were not so in a legal sense. To
have sAid they would inflict bodily harm on other dealers,
or vilify them in the newspapers, or bring on them social
ostracism, or similar declarations, these the law would
have deemed threats, for they may deter a man of ordinary
courage fVom the prosecution of his business in a way which
accords with '-is own notions; but to say, and even that is
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inferential from t:2e correspondence, that if they continued
to sell to plaintiff, the membersp of tle association would
not buy from them, is not a threat. It does not interfere
with the dealers free choice; it may have prompted him to a
somewha$ sordid calculation; he may have considered which
custom was most profitable, and have acted accordingly but
this was not such coercion and threats as constituted the
acts of the combination unlawful" This case is on all
fours with Barr v. Essex Trades Council and the Stave Co.
case except that in this case the threat was made by the
employer and not by the employe.
In Robinson v. Pine Land Ass'n the plaintiff and def-
endant owned stores, both selling the same kind of goods.
Defendant threatened to discharge his employes if they
traded with plaintiff. This conduct was held not actionable.
"If the defendant could so control its employes as to pre-
vent their dealing with plaintiff, or so control their wages
as to divert them from the channels of plaintiff's business
in favor of its own, we know of no rule making it actionable
In Sinsheimer v. Garment Workers, adispute arose be-
tween plaintiff and defendant "caused by the fact that the
piaintiff has discriminated against the members of this
voluntary ass'n (0'fr) in the employment of labor necessary
to carry on its business. ... While this dispute
continued, the defendants sent circulars to the plaintiff's
customers, which were clearly intended as a threat to such
customers, that, in case such customers continued to do
business with the plaintiff, the defendants would notify
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other trade unions to withhold their business from any firm
that continued to sell the plaintiff's goods, and the uv-
idence show4 that, in consequence of such circulars, pur-
chasesi of goods from plaintiff, were cancelled by their
customers, and statements were made b., other customers that,
unless plaintiff settled his dispute with the defendants,
future business would be discontinued" In the General
Term)Van Brunti P. J., said "I fail to see that there is
any infringement of any provision of law in the issuance of
such a circular." The judgment was reversed and the in-
junction dissolved.
In Bowen v. Matheson the defend-,nts, keepefs of sea-
mens boarding houses, combined to control the business of
the shipping mastersof Boston, by (among other things) using
"our best endeavors to prevent our boadders shipping in any
vessel where any of the crew are shipped from boarding hou-
ses that are not in good standing" Plaintiff was a non-
member, and defendants notified "the public that they had
laid him on the shelf, and notified his customers and friend
that he c aldship xx mzx, seamen for them"&C. A demurrer
to the declaration .. "he wag sustained. The
court said, "If their effect is to destrpy the business of
shipping masters who are not members of the association,
it is such a result as in the competition of business often
follows from a course of proceeding that t-he law permits.
. . . As the declaration sets forth no illegal acts on the
part oC the defendants, the demuTrer must be sustained"
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Snow v. Wheeler was an action to recover money from
defendants who held it as trustee of the trade union which
plaintiff reRresents. The defense was that the object of
the union wa-3 illegal and therefore the plaintiff could not
recover. The union was formed "for the purpose of protect-
ing themselves against the 'encroachments' of their employ-
ers, and to agree in furtherance of such object not to teach
others thetr trade unless hy consent of the society' The
court said, "It is insisted that the agreements thus estab-
lished between the members of the order are in unlawful
restraint of trade, and therefore illegal, as against public
policy. But in the opinion of the court the point is not
well taken. kIn the relations existing between xx±±K±
labor and capital, the attempt by co-operation on the one
side to increase wages by diminishing competition, or on the
other to increase thp profits due to capital, is within
certain limits lawful and proper. It ceases to be so when
unlawful coercion is employed to control the freedom of the
individual in disposing of his labor or capital?
See Parker v. Bricklayers Undon, 21 Wk. L. Bull., 223
and Lord Shand in Allen v. Flood, ante p. SL
It seems to me that this is the true ground of the
decision in Keeble V. Hickeringill. There is certainly
nothing unlawful in firing guns into the air, but it is a
"violent' and not a 'peaceable' interference with a man's
right to gain a livelihood in a case where there was no
competition. V is for this reason that Keeble v. Hicker-
ingill is right and Carrington v. Taylor is wrong. (Hawkins
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J., p. 20.)
Which of these rules just discussed is the soundest
I do not undettake to decide but in solving the propo:;ition
it would be well to notice the law governing strikes. We
can now see the general principles that underlie that sub-
ject. One man or a body of men can agree not to work for
another and the employer can have no action. This claarly
comes under the first exception. Generally the reason for
their so doing was some disagreement about wages or some
matter connected with the work. This was competition be-
tween capital and labor. The courts have certainly hald
that the strikers must only stop at the use of unlawful (?)
means in inducing laborers not to enter the employment of
the plaintiffs. It seems to me that the general principles
of both strikes and boycotts a'e the same.
In a discussio of the Oxley Stave Co. case (56 Alb.
L. J., 390.) it was said, "The gist of a boycott, however,
is to draw utterly disinterested mxxmxooutsiders into a
controversy, for the sake of compelling a recalcitrant
employer to yield, through making life generally miserable
or the transaction of any business i-mpossible. There
could, of course, be no limit in principle to the-extension
of the circumference of the boycott circle. A dispute
between an4 employer and its employes in one small locality
might be made to cripple or demoralize business in remote
places, and among persons who had no knowledge of what the
original difficulty was about, and had never heard of the
original parties" In other words, we are to believe that
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competition between capital and labor is unreasonable be-
cause it affects "disinterested outsiders" and is therefore
unlawful. We may have competition between capitalists or
between laborers, but competition between capitalist and
laborer, never. In the Mogul case Lord Bowen, made a
few remarks that are very pertinent to the issue raised by
this criticism. "We were told' he said, "that competi-
tion ceases to be the lawful exercise of trade, and so to
be a lawful excuse for what will harm ahother, if carried to
a lenglit which is not fair or reasonable. The offering
of reduced rates by the defendants in the present case is
said to have been 'unfair'. This seems to assume that,
apart from fraud, intimidation, iolestation or obstruction,
of some other personal right in rem or personam, there is
some4natural standard of 'fairness' or 'unreasonableness'
(" be determined by the internal consciousness of the judges
and juries),beyond which competition ought not in law to go.
There seems to be no authorityj and I think, with submission,
that trere is no suff'icient reason for such a proposition.
It would impose a novel fetter upon trade., The defendants
we are told by the plaintiffs' counsel, might lawfully lower
v-' ~s providedithey did not lower them beyond a 'fair fxxtgk
freight', whatever that may mean. But Wkere is it extab-
lished that there is any such restriction upon commerce? And
what is to be the definition of a 'fair freight'? It is
said that it ought to ije a normal rate of freight, such-as
is reasonabl7F'remunerative to the ship owner. But over"
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what period of time is the average of this reasonable re-
munerativeness to be calculated? All commfercial men with
capital are acquainted with the ordinary expedient of sowing
one year a crop of apparently unfruitful pp'ices, in order
by driving competition away, to reap a fuller harvest of
in
profit"the future; and until the present argument at the
bar it may be doubted whether shipowners or merchants were
ever deemed to be bound by law to wonform to some imaginary
'normal' standard of freight or prices, or that law courts
had a right to say to them in respect bf their competitive
tariffs,""hus far shalt thou go al-cd no further'. To at-
tempt to limit English competition in this way would Imktkx
±nfxx probably be as hopeless an endeav.or as the experiment
of King Canute. But on ordinary principles of law no such
fetter on freedom of trade can in my opinion be warranted.
A man is bound not to use is prbperty so as to infringe
upon another's rightx. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laudas. If engaged in actions which may involve danger
to others, he ought, speaking generally, .o take reasonable
care to avoid endangering them. But there is surely no
doctrine of law which compels him to use his property in a
way that judges and juries may consider reasonable. See
Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. C., 349. If there is no
such fetter upon the use of prd)perty known to the English
|law, why should there be any such a fetter upon a trade?"
The question may also well be asked,"Why is such a fetter
placed upon competition between capital and labor"? I#
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there is competition how can you stop its being carried to
the bitter end' in one case and not in the other? Are all
men 'created equal'? It seems to depend altogetha- r -1or
y6 iappen to be competing with.
In the cases cited on lagal justifi,%!ation and excuse,
I don't mean to say that the decission has always gone on
the grounds I have indicated as matters which will or will
not excuse; 1 simply mean to say that I thin, that a careful
analysis of the facts of each case will bear out the pro-
positions I have stated.
There is another class of cases where several Amer-
ican authorities have allowed the interference to be justi-
fied. A & B enter a contract terminable at the will of
either party. r A)J Intending to injure X4 threatens to
break the contract if B has any business relations withA.
Does 'have an action against A if B refuses to deal with him?
It is held that he has none in Heywood V. Tillson, Payne v.
Ry. Co., and Raycroft V/ Tayntor. They say that defendant
is only doing what he had a legal right to do and therefore
cannot be held liable. So it is lawful for A to build a
slaughter house on his own land, if it happen that his land
is so situated that the property rights of no one else are
injured; and that is peculiarly the question in this case.
Not was any right of B's injured but was any right of X's
invaded? His right to gain a livelihood is certainly
invaded, now will the law excuse the act unde- the circum-
stances?, In Ry. Co. v. Greenwood the defendant threatened
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to discharge its employes if they patronized the plaintiff's
otel. "The appellant (de'ft. contends that the petition
fails to state a cause of action; because (becond) under
the facts alleged, appellant had the right 'to prohibit its
employes or servan t s from attending any place of resort,
such as a saloon and boarding house combi.ned, under penalty
of being discharged', and therefore did no wrong to appellek
The court said, "Were the acts the doing of which appellant
declared to its servants should be the cause of their dis-
charge, such as would justify the action which wa threaten-
ed? . . . The~employes, presumabli, had the right to eat
and drink where they cho4e, so long as they violated no
contract with their employer and performed their, service
well, and the malicious use of such moral coercion upon them
by the appellant as this petition alleges, for the purpose
of injuring appellee, was wrongful, and made appellant lia-
ble for such damages as was thereby inflicted. Appellee
did not have the richt to intentionally induce others to
abstain from patronizing appellee, except for a legitimate
purpose. . . According to tke allegations, it did, by
threats, of unlawful discharge, caiuse their servants to
withdraw their patronage, with intent to injure appellee.
This was not the exercise of a legal right, as contanded and
the second proposition of the appellee cannot be sustained7
See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Freeman, in Payne
v. Ry. Co. where he says, "The rule I have maintained is in
strict accord with a maxim of the law, so well founded in
reason as to need no argument or auithority to support it,
that is, that a man must so use his own as not to do an
injury to others. That this means he shall so enjoy his
legal rights as not to do a wrong to the legal rights of
another, I freely concede. But here is a use of a legal
right to discharge employes, for the directp urpose and with
no other, and for no other reason except to prevent their
trading with a party legitimately entitled by his location
and the character of his business to such trade. Here
is the use of a legal right, iV deprive the other of that
which is his legal right, to-wit, the property he has in
the good will of his business.... por a party who has
the power, to use that power, to destroy or injure tha
value of this property, in the exercise of a right, not for
any reason of advantage to himself, but solely to injure
another, ought not to be permitted by an enlightened system
of jurisprudence in this country.
The fallacy of the position maintained by these cases
is clearly pointe6 out in the portion of, the opinion of
Chipley v. Atkinson quoted with approval in Raycroft v.
Tayntor. It is as fdllows, "Where one does an act which
is legal in itself, and which violates no right of another
person, it is true that the fact that the act is done from
malice or other bad motive toward another, does not give the
latter a right of action against the former. Though there
be loss or dakage resulting to the other from the act and
the doer was prompted to it solely b, malice, yet if the
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act be legal and violates no legal right of the other person
there is no right of action. It must be admitted that in
these cases Lhe act is prima facie lawful but if we have
tried to prove one thing move than another in this thesis,
it is, that these acts do viblate a legal right of the
other person, i.e., the right to gain a livelihood.
The true rule governing these cases is the one!kH ±xx
governing competition as heretofore discussed. See, Robin-
son v. Land Ass'n, ante p. .&; Gauthier v. Perrault, ante
p. ?9_; and Clemmitt v. Watson, ante P. ?,Y Heywood v.
Tillson may also be justified on another ground. Post p./Lj.
Graham v. Ry. Co., is governed by the provisions of the La.
code, but supports the proposition contended for.
The grounds of justification and excuse pointed out
are the ones that seem to be quite well settled by the au-
thorities. However some of the cases seem to indicate
others. In Heywood v. TILLson, the plaintiff had been inWy
terfering with defendants business and was practivally seek-
ing to ruin it, and defendant, not wishing to have his em-
ployes influenced by the plaintiff, threatenbd to discharge
any employe who occupied plaintiff's house. At page 231 the
court says, "Thre defendant was doing a large business,
having five or six hundred men in his employ. It was of
the utmost importance to his success that his employes slhout
be of good habits, friendly to his enterprise and interested
i his prosperity? Protection of business is the grounds
on which this case should be sustained, rather than those
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already indicated. For example the employer may re-
quire that his employes be Semperate, or, as in this case
that the employe shall not associate with one whosi inter-
ests are inimical to those of the employer. It seem clear
that these acts should be justified.
In Van Horn v. Van Horn, another ground of justifi-
cati(-n is pointed out by the court. It is said, "As to
the question of privelege, the trial court chargea the jury
that a man has a right to inquire of his neighborx into the
circumstances of a Ierson to whom he is giving credit, and
that person may on such occasions communic-ate freely, and
unless his communication be of facts which he does not hon-
estly believe or the communication be such as was made not
for the honest rurpose of conveying the information to the
inquirer, but such as in the judgment of the jury, uhder
the evidence, shows that the defendant took advantage of
that privelege to gratify a malicious purpose, no action
will lie'. This is a correct ptatement of the law".
There may be other grounds of excuse which the courts
will find it necessary to allow when they are presented to
them for adjudication, but I have noticed no others in the
cases as I have read them.
In t.e foregoing discussion we have only intended to
/
discuss the law whero therewas no existing obligation be-
t*wen the second and third party, in other words an inter-
ference with the right to enter, into future relations. Is
the law the same where there is an existing obligation wjich
is interfered with? Itthink not. In rhan, of the cases
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touching this qluestion unlawful means were clearly used? but
where no unlawful means were used do rhe grounds of josti-
fication vest on competition? From an examination of the
facts of tbe following cases there seems to have been no
competition, and no unlawful means were used, but the de-
fendant was held liable. Forbes v. Morse, 69 Vt., 220;
Morgan v. Andrews, 107 I[ich., 33; and Jo!es v. Stanley,
76 N. C., 355. The facts of the following; cases clear-
ly show that there was competition, and that defendant used
no unlawful means, still the defendant was held liable-
?ixby v. Dunlop, 56 N. F., 456; Parker v. Bricklayers Union,
SI WK. L. Bull., 223, 226; Daniel V. Swearengen, 6 S. C.,
297; and Exchange Tel. Co. v. Gregory &c., 1896, 1 Q. B.,147
Nor should the law be the same. To begin wih there exists
.omething which ev, ry one may strive to get by honest com-
petition, buit after one person has succe-ded in capturing
this thing and reducing it to possession (one might say) for
a definite period, by means of a contract, then no one has
a right to disturb that possession simply because he wants
the same thing. He has had his day and has lost. Let
him be content.
Many of the courts say there is no distinction be-
tween time contracts and mere contract at will, but with one
exception (Salter v. Howard, 43 Ra., 601,) a careful analy-
sis off the facts will show that the true rule is that laid
down by lord Shand in Allen v. flood, namely, competition.
(The cases involving these facts have been discussed, supra,
wilh others touching the principle of competition.) And
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why should the rule be different? In this case the possess.
ion is not obtained for a definite time but only for the
time being and every one skould be allowed to compete for
its future possession.
Briefly stated I would sumarize the law on this
question as follows: (1) One person or a combination of
persons may refuse to have any business A with X and he has
no cause of action; (2) Peaceable argument may always be
used to get thtrd parties to join this combination; (3) If
the third parties refuse to yield to argument, then the
bringing of any pressure to bear on them, makes the party
so doing liable where there is no competition; (4) where L-I-
there is sompetition and the third partyl refuses to yield
to arg,ment, then any further means which stop srort of un-
lawful acts may be used to compel them to refrain from
dealing with X. When I use the word 'unlawful' in this
connection I/give it its modern meaning.
I here end my discussion of this vexed question. It
has sometimes been hard for me to tell ji st where I was at
(perhaps others will experience the same difficulty when
reading this thesis) But my; final conclusions are stated
and I rest in peace.
10 J.
PROVINCE OF EQUITY IN BOYCOTTS.
We have no* come to the point where it is .ossible
to enquire when equity will intervene in boycotts. Of
course inlthosex cases where the act is allowed to be justi-
fied an injunction will necessarily be refused. Moiul case,
Bohn ifg. Co. v. Hollis. Cote v. Murphy. Cont. Ins. Co.
v. Underwriters. But where it is held tt.at the act is on-
justifiable, will equity intervene? The jurisdiction uf
equity to protect property is undoubteo. Emperor of Aus-
tria v. Day, 3 D. F. & J., 317; Atty-Gen. v. Gas Co., 3 D.
M. & G., 304; and Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley. The
propcrty which is sought to be protected in these cases is
not visible or tangible but invisible and intangible. The
question naturally presents itself, will equity lend its
aid to the protection of such property or will it confine
its sphere of protection to corporeal property. In Brace
Bros. v. Evans, 18 Pitts. L. J., (N. S.) 399, the court
said, "But it is claimed that the plAintiff's right to con-
dilct their business is personal, and that equity will not
interfere for th-e protection of mere personal rights, but
only to preserve rights of property.
"The kanguage of our own Act of Assembly woiild seem
to include every possible right of individuals, out it must
be construed in reference to the regognized power of courts
of chancery, and also with reference to he clause of our
own constttution which provides that 'e right of trial by
jury shall be -as heretofore, and the right thereof remain
inviolate'. The cou --s have heretofore been careful not
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to extend their equitable powerx so as to infringe upon the
vight of trial by jury further than is becessary for the
preservation of other rights equally sacred. ...
"It is difficult to see why the rights of life and
liberty (which include the right to provide a living for
ones self and family by any =mx lawful means), and the
right of acquiring property, s ould not be protected as fully
as the less important right of possessing property. It can
not be that the strong arm of chancery can be successfully
invoked to preserve the accumulations of the rich, and is
powerless to protect the capital of the poor, his brain and
muscle and power and will to work when and as ie pleases.
This is, in a legal sense, property; it belongs to each man
exilusively, and withi the mass of 'he community it is their
all. It is entitled to +'e protection of ,he law, and none
is more interested in the assertion of this powerx than the
defendants as representatives of organized labor.
"The protec4irn of trade-marks, liter work and good
will, cannot be justified -pon any x:kKx grrxn theory other
than that a man has a right of property in the labor of his
hands and brains. It is therefore clear that the plaintir
being in the lawful exercise of a lawful right, should be
permitted to conduct their business as heretofore, without
molesta* ion from anyone" This statement of t.Qe law is
certainly correct. The courts have Rixxx never re used
to protect property because it was incorporeal. In Emp. of
Aostriav. Day the defendants were enjoined from issuing and
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circu lating sprious bank notes in Auistria. The couirt said
"That the eflett of this int-roduction will be to disturb
the circnulation of he kingdom cannot in my opinion be doubt-
ed, and what will be the efflct of that disturbance? Sure-
ly to endanger, to prejudice, and to deteriorate the value
of the existing circulating medium, and thus to affect di-
rectly all the holders of Austrian bank note.s, and indirect-
ly, if not directly, all the holders of property in the Stae,
* . . I agree that the jurisdiction of this court in a case
of this na -ore -ests upon injury to property, actual or pro-
spective, and that this at s no jurisdi(ction to prevent
th-e commission of acts which are merely criminal or merely
illegal, and do not affect any rights of property, but I
think there aree hiere rights of property quite sufficient to
found the jurisdaction of thts court"
We have seen the same property protected in the striM-
cases. T1he jurisdiction of equity cannot be succe:sfully
attacked on this ground. The jurisdiction of equity being
to protect property, "Equity will interfere by injunction to
prevent (1) an injury which threatens i-reparable damage,
or (2) a continuing injury where the legal remedy therefor
may involve a multillivity of suits. This jurisdiction is
established and unquestionable. In practice, the criter-
ion of its application is the inadequacy of the legal remedy
depending on whether (1) 'the injury done or threatened is
of such- a natlre tha- when accomplished, the property can-
not be restveto its original condition, or cannot be
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replaced by means of compensation in money'; (2) whether f-u
full compensation for thie entire wrong can be obt:iined with-
out resort to a number of suits. 3 Por. Eq. Jur., sec.
1338, 1346, 1357" Barr v. Trades Council. See the fol-
lowing cases where an injunction was granted. Casey v.
Typographical Union. Hopkins v. Stave Co. Veglehan v.
Guntner. Jackson v. Stanfield. Brace Bros. V/ Evans.
Temperton v. Russell.
In Long shore Printing v. Howell, the court recogniz-
ed the rule but refused to apply it to the case, saying "T6-
showing of plaintiff is clearly ins-sufficient to bring it-
self wit hin the rule thus explicitly stated by the learned
Judge, (Baldwin J., in Bonaparte v. Ry. Co., 1 Baldw. 205).
The plaintiff may have its actioyr at law against defendants
for some of the acts compliined of, and defend nts or some
of them may have by tX1ir condu' L;c 1iiisaelves to
a criminal prosecution under the statute, and the plaintiff
may have been much annoyed, and at times seriously harrase4
by defendants; yet one thing is clear, there is no such per-
tistent, aggresive and virulent boycott now in progress,
nor was there St the time of the commencement of this suit,
as to jus'4 ify the court in saying that plaintiff's business
and property is being, or is about to be irreparably in-
jured. ,re do not say that an injunction is an improper or/
unavailable remedy to stay the desiructive and pzenicious
ravages of a boycott, but that in this particular case
plaintiff has not bromght itself within the rules of that
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particular jurisdiction of equity" This case is certainly
zm an extreme one and would not be generally followed.
Nor shouid it be, for it is evident that where the parties go
beyond their legal rights, t;-e injury to another's riht to
gain a livelihood is in its very nature irreparable and
should be enjoined.
B L A C K L I S T I N ,.
"A blacklist is defined to be 'a list of persons
special
marked out for"avoidance, antagonism cr enmity on the tart
of those who prepare t' e list or those among whom it is in-
tended to circulate; as where a trades union blacklists
workmen who refuse to conform to lts rules, etc. It is
sometimes used by strikers against citizens to deter them
from continuing dealing with the part, or parties struck
against, but it is most usually resorted to by combined em-
players, who exchange lists of their employes who go on
strikes with the agreement that none of them will employ the
workmen whose names are on the list" Cogley on Strikes,
293. It will be seen t-at this is only one method of
conducting a boycoot and should therefore be governed by
the same rules. Blacklisting was held to be unlawful in
Mattison v. Ry Co., 2 TTisi Prius (0.) 276, where the facts
would seem to bring he case directly within the principle
of the Bohn Mfg. Co. case. In two cases in the U. S. C. C.
it has bee. held that ther wa::. no action under facts simi-
lar to the last case. McDonald v. Ill. Cent. Ry. Co., and
the Ketcham case, uinreported, See 57 Alb. L. J., 115.
In Worthington against Waring, 157 Mass., 421, on a
simijlar state of facts an injunction was refused apparently
on statutory grounds.
In Trollope v. Trades Federation, 72 L. T. R. (N.S.),
342, an injunction was granted in favor of an employer again
st a labor union, restraining them from publishing a black-
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list of certain employes of his. The court distinguishes
the principle case from Jenkinsoyi v. Ieild, 8,T. L. R., 540,
which was an action for damages. These are all the cases
I have been able to find on this subject. None of them
are at all satisfactory so far as they attempt to state the
law governing the vpestion.
INTERSTAr7E C0.!UV'JRCE ACT. 115.
Act of Congress, Feb. 1, 1887, c. 104;
24 stat. at L. 379.
ti " " Mch. 2, 1889, C. 382;
25 Stat. at L. 855.
" " " Feb. 10, '91, C. 128;
26 Stat. at L. 743.
A few peculiar phases are added to the law of boy-
cotts by the Interstate Commerce Act. Paragraph 2 of
sec.3reads as follows, "Every common carrier subject to the
provisio'Aof this act shall, according to their resepective
powers, afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities
for the interchange of traffic, between their respective
lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering
of passengers, and property to and from their several lines
and those con-necting therewith, and shall not discriminate
in their rates and charges between such connecting line-"
Unde- t e provisions of this act oneRy. Co. was enjoined
from refusing to receive interstate freight from anot,.er Ry.
co. in Chicago &c. Ry. Co. v. Burlin-ton ,?c. Ry. Co., 34
Fed., 381. The engineers on the pla-nti, f's line had
gone out on a strike and tl:e engineers on defendant's road
threatened to strike also if any freight was accepted from
the plaintiff road. Judge Love said, "Now the question is,
what shall be obeyed,- tre law of the land, of the order of
the cheLfs of the locomotive engineers? Shall a railway
company refi'se obedience to the express provisions of the
statultery law because some of its employes thre'aten to quit
its eervice, and thu s stop the 'inning of its trains? Shall
*he court presume that they will carry out siic' threats, and
deny relief to the complainant upo.! that presumption? TUl o
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temporary inconveniences to the defendtnt company, or the
public whom it serves are, in my judgnent, for one mement
to be compared with the fatal consequences whic- aist insue
from a precedent by which it wouid be established *hat a Ry.
Co. may, in violation of the law of the land, refuse to
receive and haul the cars of a connecting line, at the com-
mand of any irresponsible persons, or from its own belief
and apprehension, that its employes will leave its service,
and stop the opera'ion of its lines. Isuch an excuse as
this is wholly in &dmisible, aid it must be set aside"
Toledo &c Co. v. Penn. Co., 54 Fed., 730, presents
a different phase of the question. Imnthis case an injunc-
tion was granrte agZ,±nst 'he defendAmt under circumstances
similar to those of t'-.e preceding case. Then a supple-
mental bill was filed making P. M. Arthur, the chef exec-
utive of the B. of L. E., a defendant, and asking for an
injunction restraining him "from issuing, promulgating, or
continuing in force any rule or order of sAid brotherhood,
which shall require or command any employe of any of defen-
dant railway companies herein to refuse to handle and de-
liver any cars or freight in course of transportation from
one state to another to the complainant, or from refusing
to receive and handle cars of such freight which have been
hauled over compla rant's :'oad; and also from in any way,
directly or indirectly, endeavoring to persuade any of t:%e
employes of the defendmt railway companies whose lines con-
railway
nect wish the t of Iki complainant, not to extend to said
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company the same facilities for .nterchange of interstate
traffic as areextended by said company to othe' railway
companies" The rule referred to was rule No. 12, of the B.
of L. E., which reads as follows:- "Twelth, That hereafter,
when an issie has been sustained by the g-'and chef, and
carried into effect by the B. of L.E., it shall be recog-
nized a-s a violation of obligal-ion for a member of the
Brotherdood of Locomotive Engineers Association who may be
employed on a railroad running in connection with or adja-
cent to said road, to liandle the property belonging to said
railroad or system in any Tray thit may benefit said company
in which the B,'/ of L.E. is at issue until the greviance or
issue of whatever nat-ire or kind has been amicably settled.
In restraining Arthur from ordering the enforcement
of this rule, the court said, "Tt will be convenient, in
discussing tke question whether any relief can properly be
given to complainant against Arthur, to consider rule 12
and the acts done, or to be done, in pursuance thereof-or,
Wirst, in the light of the criminal law; second, with refer-
ence to their character as civil wrongs; and, third, with
reference to the remedies which a court of equity may afford
against them. O ,
"l. The complainant and defendant companies are
common carriers, subject to the provisions of the inter-
state commerce att, and the business exchanged 4-etween them
is averred by the bill to be nearly all interstate freight.
The second paragraph of the third sectirr of the act pro-
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rides that:- (See ante p. 115.)
In view of the foregoing section it needs no argu-
ment to demonstrate that one common carrier is expressly
reqpired by the interstate commerce act to freely inter-
change interstate freight with nother when their lines con-
nect.
Section 1O of the act, as amended, (25 Stat. at Large
p. 855.) provides that:-
Any common carrier subject to the provisions of this
act, or when such comnon carrier is a corporation, any di-
or officer
rector"thereof, or any receiver, trustee or lessee, agent,
or person acting for or employed by such corporation, who
alone or with any other corporation, company, person or
party, .'. shall willfully omit or fail to do any act,
matter, or thing in this respect required to be done, or
shall cause or willfully suffer or permit any act, matter
or thing, so directed or required by this act to bma1i be
done, not to be done, or shall aid or abet such omission or
failure, . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanorV.
By the foregoing sections, a common carrier which is
not a corporation is made liable criminally for viblations
of the interstate commerce law. But when the carrier is
a corrora 4-on and violates the law, not the corporation,
b't its officers, agents and persons acting for or employed
by Ot who willfully do the wvongfujl work, are made liable.
In Re Peasley, 44 Fed., 271. The corporation is made civ-
illy liable under sectio: S. As every lovomotive engineer
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of the defendant companies is a person employed by' a common
carrier corporation subject to the provisions of the inter-
state law, he is guilty of the offense described, and sub-
ject to the penalty imposed by section 10, if he, while
acting as engineer, for his corporation, refiises to handle
iterstate freight for the complainant, and thereby, in
his discharge of a function of the company, willfully omits
to do an act reqiuired by the law to be done; and it is im-
material whether what he does or fails to do in violation
of the statute is with or eithovt The orders of his princi-
pal. U. S. v. Tozer, 37 Fed., 635.
i ' 1  IArthvr and all the members of the brotherlood engaged
in enforcing rule 12, and in thereby aiding and abetting
every such engineer to violate the section, are equally'
guilty with &U as pr incipiAs, U. S. v. Syder, 14 Fed.,
554; and they are theeeby also guilty of conspiring to com-
mit an offense against the United States and subject to the
penalties of section 5440, Rev. St., U. S. v. Stevens, 44
Fed., 132.
But suppose that this view of sectioi. 10 is erroneous
and that t+e words, 'person acting for or employed by such
corporation', refer only to its managing officerx or agent,
the enforce-ment of rule 12, with its evident purpose,
would still be a violation of law; for even then it is quite
clear that any one, though not an officer or agent, success-
fully aiding, abetting, or procuring such offiver or agent
to violate the section, would be punishable under it as
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principle. ...
Section 1040, Rev. St., provides that - 'If two or
more persons conspire . to commit any offense against
tbe United States, . . and one or more parties do any act
to effect the object of the conspiracy, all t~le parties to
such conspirac, shall be liable'.
All persons combining to carry out rule 12 of the
brotherhood against the complainant company, if any one of
them does an act in furtherance of the combination, are pun-
ishable under the foregoing section. This is true, be-
cause as already shown, the object of the conspiracy is to
ind'-cesprocure and compel the managing officer of the
defendant compamies to refuse equal facilities to the com-
plainant xim~x for the interchange of interstate freight,
which, as we have seen, is an offense against the United
States by virtue of section 10, above qvoted. For Arthur
to send word to the committee chairmen to direct the men
to refuse to handle interstate freight of complainant, and
to"hotify the managing officers of the defendant companies
with the in+ention of procuring them to do so, all in ex-
ecution of rule 12, is an act in futherance of the conspir-
acy to procure the managing officers of the defendant com-
paniest'to commit, a crime, and subjects him and all conspir-
ing with him to the penalties of section 5440, Rev. St.
Again, for the men, in furtherance of rule 12, either to re-
fuse to handle interstate freight or to threaten to q',it, or
actually"to quit, in order to procure or induce the officers
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of the defendnt companies to violate the provisions of the
interstate commerce law, would constitute acts in further-
ance of the conspiracy, and would render them also liable
to the penalties of the same section .
In the case at bar, although malice is certainly pre-
sent, the illegality of the combination does not consist
alone in that, for both the means taken by the combinaLion
and its object are direct violations of both the civil and
the criminal law as embodied in a positive statute. Surely
it cannot be doubted that such a combination is. within the
definition of an unlawful conspiracy, recognized anddopted
by the Supreme Court of the United States. U. S. v. Petti-
bone, 148 U. S., 197, to wit, 'Acombination of two or more
persons by concerted action to accomplish a criminal or
unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal
or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means'.
2. -re now come<to the character of rule 12, and
its enforcement as a civil wrong to complainant. Lord
Justice Fry said in the case of the Steamship Co. v. 1.[cgre-
for, 23 Q. B D., 595, 624; 'I cannot doubt that whenever
persons enter into an indictable conspiracy, and that agree-
ment is carried into execution by the conspirators by means
of an unlawful act or acts which produce private inj ry to
some person, that person has a cause of action against the
conspirators'. ..
Under the principle above stated, Arthur and all the
members of the brotherhood engaged in causing ±XxK loss
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to the complainant are liable for any actual loss inflicted
in pursuance of their ctnspiracy. The gist of an, such
action must be not in the combination or conspiracy, but
in the actual loss occassioned thereby....
3. Having thus shown that Arthur and all the members
of the brotherhood with him, conspiring by enforcing rule
12 to injure complainant, will be liable in damages to com-
pla nant for any loss they may thereby occassion, the ques-
tion remains, can equity afford any relief by prelimiaary
injunction against the defendant companies and against the
engineers, under the averment of the bill that the defendant
companies threaten to refuse to interchange freight with
complainant because of the refusal of their engineers to
handle it. ...
As against the defendant companies the complainant
clearly
is, therefore,"entitled to a preliminary mandatory injunc-
tion to compel them pending the hearing, to discharge the
duties imposed by the interstate law, and to exchange with
complainant interstate freight. (Follows last case.) . . .
If a preliminary mandatory injunction may issue ag-
ainst +he defendant companies to pervent irreparable injury,
it may certainly issue against their officers, agents, em-
ployes, and servants. ...
Nor is the mandatory injunction against the engineers
an enforced specific performance of personal service.
is only an order restraining them, if they assume to do the
work of the defendant companies, from doing it in a way
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which will violate riot only the rightd of the complainant
but also the order of the court made against, their employers
to preserve those rights.
They may avoid obedience to the injunction, b,. actu-
ally ceasing to be employes of the company. ...
We finally reach the question whether Arthur =$ can
be enjoined from ordering the engineers to carry out rule
12. That he intends to enforce the rule, if not enjoined,
is not denied. If, as we have seen, the injury intended is
of such a character that the court may issue its mandatory
injunctiol against tha engineers to prevent them from in-
flicting it, Arhtur may certainly be restrained by prohibi-
tory injunction from ordering them to inflict it.V
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ANTI-TRTIST LA! or SHERMAN ACT.
Act of Congress, July 2nd, 1890;
26 Stat. at L. 209.
Let us next consider the Act of Congress of July 2,
1890, commonly known as the Anti-Trust law, in its relation
to strikes and boycotts. The sections of the act which
affe-ct tVe questions under discussion are the 1st, 4th, and
'6th. They are as follows:-
i.,'iSection 1. Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several states, or with foreign na-
tions, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who
shall make any contract or engage in any such combination
o-r conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemmanor, and,
on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceed-
ing five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding
one yewr, or by both said punishments, in the discretion
of the c cirt. ,JI *e '
Section14. The several circuit courts of the United
States are hereby invested with jtrisdiction to ,!revent and
restrain violations of this act; and it shall be the duty
of the several district attorneys of the United States, in
under the direction og the Attorney-generJwL
+-heir respective districts,"to institute proceedings in
equity to prevent and restrain such violations. Such pro-
ceeding may be by way of petition setting forth the case
and praying that such violations be enjoined or otherwise
prohibited. When the parties comrlained of shall have
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been duly notified of such petition the rCourt dhall proceed
as soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the
case; and pending such petition and before final decree, the
court may at any time make such temporary restraining order
or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises.
Section 6. Any propertly owned under any contract or
by aiy combination, or pursuant to any conspiracy (and being
the subject thereof) mentioned in section one of this act,
and being in the course of transpor-.ation from one State to
another, or to a foreign country, shall be forfeited to the
UInited States, and may be seized and condemned by like pro-
ceeding as those provided by law for the forfeiture, sei-
zure and condemnation of property imported into this coun-
try contrary to law.
It must first be noticed that the act creates no
right in equity in favor of a private ]e-son or persons.
Sec. 4, and Blindell v. Hagan, 54 Fed., 40; aff'd 56 id.696.
In this case Judge Billings said, "The injunction has been
asked for, first, undert the act of 1890, (26 St. p. 209.)
Known as 'An act to protect trade and commerce against un-
lawful restraints and monopolies'. This acts makes all
combinations in restraint of trade or commerce unlawful, and
fuinishes +hem by fine or imprisonment, and authorizes suits
at law for triple damages for its violation, but it gives
no:new right to bring a suit in eouity, and a caref,1l study
of the act has brought me +o the conclusion that suits in
eqvity or injunction suits by an" other than the government
126.
of the 1Thited States are not authorized by it.,
In T1. S. v. workingmen's Amalgamated Council, Judge
Billings held that the act applied to combinations of work-
igmen as well as combinations of capitalists and granted
an injunction. 6See U. S. v. A.ger.) The bill "avers that
a,disagreement between the warehousemen and their employes
been
aud the principle draymen and their subordinates had"adopted
by allathe organizations named in the bill, until by this
vast combination of men and of organizations, it was threat-
ened thatq1nless there was an acquiesence in the demdnds of
the subordinate workmen andoraymen, all the men in all the
defendant organizations would leave work, and would allow
no work in any department of business; that violence was
threatened and used in support of this demdand; and that
this demand included the interstate and foreign commerce
which f~ow- through the city of New Orleans' (Aff'd in
57 Fed.- 85.)t,
-,l I In .Traterhouse v. Comer, Judge Speer said that the
rule offihe B. of L.E. which was considered in the Toledo
PQc.lPy. case wou1cd, if enforced, liolate the act.
In U. S. v. Elliott, Judge 7hayer held that "a com-
bination whose rprofessed object is to avrest the operation
fo railroads whose lines extend from a graat city into ad-
joitiing states, until such roads accede to certain demands
made upon them, whether such demands are in themselves rea-
sonable or unreasonable, jujst ov unjust, is certainly an un-
lawful conspiracy in restraint of commerce among the states"
and withi, the statute. An in junction waw granted --e-
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straining the defendants "from doing the acts threatened, in
pursuance of the alleged agreement.' These acts were "that
the several defendants have uombined and conspired to in-
duce persons in the employ of the said railway companies
to leave t},e service of their respective companies, and to
prevent them from securing other operatives.' in the same
case reported in 64 Fed., 27, the demurrer to the bill was
overruled by Judge Phillips.
In Thomas v. Cincinatti p c. Ry. Co., one Phelan was
punished for contempt for violating an injunction and the
act of Congress in question -'as cited to sustain the juris-
diction of the court in gxx gxx~x $.xxx1:xm commiting
said Phelan. The Circuit Court also relied on the Statute
in U. S. v. Debs but the Suipreme Court laced its decisirn
on other grounds.The nice question to lie solved in the cases
arising under this statute, is, does the statute apply to
lawful as well as unlawful restraints and does it apply to
restraints where the object is not primarily directed againt
interstate commerce? In all of the cases except U. S. v.
Elliott unlawful means were clearly fsed. In, this case
the use of no lnlawfu:l means were charged but it war alleged
"that it is the purpose and object of the defendants who are
engaged in the aforesaid conspiracy to secure to themselves
the entire control of int erstate commerce"? &c. U. 9. v.
Freight Ass'n, 166 J '. 9., ±6, is a very interesting case
on this point. It wasn't a strike case but some of "he
principles laid down are worthy of notice. It was held
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that it wasn't necessary to prove an intent to restrain in-
terstate commerr'e, but if such restraint is the necessary
effect of the agreement that is sufficient and further that
(in this -ease) the agreement "though legal when made, be-
came illegal on the passage of the act of July 2, 1890"
The act is certainly ver:j broad and no one can tell how far
the courts xN will go in construing its p.rovisions. See,
U. S. v. Coal Dealers' Ass'n of Cal., 85 Fed., 2.92; and
fl. S. v. Addystone Pipe S Kteel Co., 85 ved. 271.
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"OMNIBUS" INJUNCTIONS.
,A great deal has been written and said about 'omnibug
injunctions, i.e., onerestraining all the wotid from doing
a certa-i act. It seems to me that there is a great mis-
conception of the Law governing this question. In the Debs
case an injunction was granted "khereby the defe-ndants, and
all persons combining and conspiring with them, and all per-
sons whomsoever, were commanded and enjoined"&C. It is
claimed that the form of this injunction is unwarranted by
the practice of courts of equity. It is undoubtedly true
that an injunction is never granted against persons who are
not parties to the suit. Iveson v. Iarris. Fellows v.
Fellows. Schalk v. Schmidt. State v. Anderson. But
"the order will, if nesessary, be extended to his (deft's)
servants, workmen, and agents, and it is of course to insert
these words' Toledo ecc. Ry. Co. v. Penn Co., 54 Fed., 730,
742, and authorities cited. It also seems to be settled
that one not named in the injunction order may be commi~ted
for contempt if he knowingly 'assist or abets' the person
enjoined. Seward v. Paterson, 1897, 1 Cu., 545;(citing
Wellesley V. Earl of 1Iornington,; Lewes v. M organ; and Avery
v. Andrews.) State v. *;emd Wimpy v. Phinizy. It
may seem paradoxical that one can be committed for contempt
when he could not be enjoined; The difficulty is clearly
explained in Wellesley v. Mornington. An injunction was
granted rest~raining the defendant from cutting timber but
it did not by its terms include his servants of agents. It
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was moved to commit one Batty, an agent of the defendant,
"for a breach of the injunction"' The r.'aster of the Rolls
said, "You do not ask to commit him for th-e contempt, but
for the breach of an injunction by which he is not enjoined.
I think the objection~fat al to this fo-'m of mzix notice of
motion; but I by no means think, that because Batty is not
enjoined in his character of servant and agent, he cannot
be punished for knowingly aiding and abstihing lord ',orning-
ton in doin-- that which this court expressly prohibited
The plaintiff then moved '"to commit him for the contempt,
in being party and privy to, and in aiding and assisting the
breach of the injunction, which restrained the defendant,
the Earl of Mrrnington from cutting timber"&c. ,Batty at the
time knowing that these a'cts were forbidden" The M, aster of
the Rolls now said: "By the forbearance of the :laintiff, I
am ppared the painful necessity of making an order. If the
matter had been pressed, I should have found it my duty to
commit Mr. Batty for his contempt in intermeddling with thc4
these rnatters"
In Seward v. Paterson, plaintiff leased certain pre-
mises to the defendant. The defendant covenanted not to
"do or suffer anything hoisy, noisome, offensive or incon-
venient to the lessor? &c. The defendant, 'is unde-tenant4
agents and servants were enjoined from violating this cove-
nant. It was alleged that the defendant disobeyed this
ordor, by holding boxing matches, upon the premises, and tht
one Shepard and lMurray had assi-sted him. They were all com-
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mitted for contempt by Judge North, who said, (after quoting
from Wellesley v. Mornington with approval.) "In the present
case Muhrray was not a party to the action, and upon that
ground his counsel a-gued that he could not he committed for
contempt. That does not follow. An injunction to restr-
ain a man, his servants and agents, from doing any act, is
a common recognized fvum, and the injunction can be enforced
against servants and agents although they are not parties to
the action. Murray's counsel failed to explain why ser-
vants and agents should be liable to be committed, though
they are not parties to the action; while other persons
who had done exactly the same things could not be committed
because they were not parties to the action. In my opinion
that is not the law; any one who deliberately assists anoth-
er in committing a breach of an injunction can be punished
for his contempt of court in so doing equally with a servant
or agent of the persoi enjoined. I think the words 'ser-
vants and agents' are inse'ted by way of warning to such per
sons, not as describing a particular class of perions, but
generally as describing assistants of the -ersonx who is
restrained'.' Murray appealed. On the appeal Lindley,
L. J. said, "Now, let us consider what jurisdiction the cout4
has to make an order against Murray. Trhere is no injunc-
tion against him - he is no moe bound by the injunction
granted agdnst Paterson than any other member of the public,
He is bound, like oiher member's of the public, not to in-"k
terfere with, and not to obstruct, the course of justice,
an4 the case, if any, made against him, must be this - not
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that he has technically ingringed the injunction, which was
not gran'ed agaglat him in any w sense of the word, but
that he has been aiding ind abetting others to set the court
at defiance, and deliberately treating the ordjer of the
court as uinworthy of notice. If he has so conducted him-
self, it is perfectly ddle to say tlat there is no juris-
diction to attach kim for contempt, as distinguished from
a breach of an inju3nction"
This I apprehend to be the true scope of the injunc-
tion In the Debs case. If agents and servants and persons
wKo assist or abet the violation of an injunction, can be
punished for contempt, whether they be parties to the suit
or named in the injunction order, isn't it better to insert
these words 'by way of warning' so there may be notice? The
question was not involved in the Debs case, and in Re Lennon
the contemner was clearly a servant assisting and abetting.
The only case where the question seems to have been discuss-
ed is U. S. v. Alger, 62 Fed., 824. In this case Judge
Baker says, "I think that in this proceeding the court
(Judge Woods, as Judge of t_e cDrciit court) had jurisdic-
tion to issue this writ. . . . Now, in this case, the inl
formation, I think, lacks considerable of having the wertain-
ty and precision that is essential. . . It does not
allege,- and that is the most serious t'.-ing, to my mind,-
that either by his words or ]is acts he was engaged in aid-
ing the common object with other memlers of the American
Railway Union. If what this man did was not done to give
aid or cmmfort or encouragement to the object of arresting
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the mails, if it was an independant crime the man was com-
mitting, if he wanteli to commit arson or robbery, without
having any connection with these men that were engaged in
the interruption of commerce, then he would not be within
the terms of the restraining order7 This seems to be a
correct exposition of the real meaning and effect of the so
called 'omnibus injunctlnn' granted in the Debs case. No





158 U. S., 564.
It will be unnecessary to state the facts of this
case as they are still fresh in the minds of all. The im-
portant qlestion is, was the action justified? It can
scarcely be doubted that if the injunction had been asked
fou by the different railroads concerned that it would have
been granted on the various grounds pointed out. .But the
injunction was soivrht and obtained by the United States and
it is necessary to notice the grounds on which it was based.
The injunc-ion commanded the defendants, "and all persons
combining and conspiring with them, and allrother persons
whomsoever, absolutely to desist and refrain from in any
manner interfering wibh, hindering, obstructing or stopping
any of the business of any of the following named rail-
roads, (naming roads) as common carriers of passengers and
freight between o-" aong the States of the United States,
and from in any way or manner interfering wi~h,hindering,
obstructing or stopping an,, mail trains, express trains or
other trains, whether' passenger, engaged in interstate
commerce, or carrying passengers or freight between or among
the States; and from in any manner interfering wihh, hinder
ing, obstructing or stopping any engines, cars or rolling
stook of any rnf said companies engaged in interstate com-
merce,, or in connection wil-h 'he carriage of passengers or
frei.-ht between or among the States; and from in an. manner
interfering with, injuring or de.troying ani of the proerty
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of any of said raily'oads engaged in or for the purpose of,
or in'connection with, interstate commerce or the carriage
of the mails of the United States or the transportation of
passengers or freight between or among the states; and from
entering upon the grounds or premises of an. of said rail-
roads for the purpose of interfering with, hindering, ob-
structing or stopping any of said mail trains, passenger or
freight trains engaged in inter ;tate commerce, or in the
transportation of passengers or freight between or among the
States, or for -he purpose of interfering with, injuring or
destroying any of said property so engaged in or used in
connection with interstate commerce or the transportation of
passengers or property between or among the states; and from
injuring or destroying any part of the tracks, roadbed, or
road or permanent s~ructures of ,aid railroads; and from
injuring, destroying or in any way interfering with any of
the signals or swithhes of said railroads; and from displac-
ing or extinguishing anj of the signals of any of said rail-
roads, and from spiking, locking or in any manner fastening
any of 'he switches of an- of said -'ailroads, and from un-
coupling or in any way hampering or obstructing the control
by any of said railroads of any of the cars, engines, or
parts of trains of any of said railroads engaged in inter-
s+ate commerce or in the transpor~atin of passengers or
freight between or among the states; or engaged in carrying
an:, of the mails of the U3Aited States; and from comp~lling
or inducing or attempting to compel or induce, by threats,
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intimidation ,persuasion, force or- vlolence, any of the em-
, -
A1loyes"'f any of said rail'oadsin connection with the inter-
state business or commerce of suci- -ailroads or the carriage
of the United States i-ails by such -ailraods, or the trans-
purtation of passengers or property between or among the
states; and from compelling or inducing or attempting to comi-
peli or induce by threats, intimidation, force, or violence
rail
any of +he employes of any of said"roads who are employed by
bych railraads, and engaged in its service of interstate
commerce or in the opera4 ion of any of its trains carrying
the mail of the United States, or doing interstate business,
or in the Ptansportati(n of passengers and freight between
anIJ among the states, to lea--ve the service of the slid
railroads; and from preventing~erson whatever, by threats,
intimidalion, force or violence from entering the service
of any of said railroads and doing the work thereof, in the
cqrrying of the mails of the United States, or the transpot
tation of passengers e. freight between or among the States;
and from doing an. act whatever in furtherance of any con-
spiracy or combinati',n to restrain either of said railroadx
companies or receivers ilkthe free and unhindered control
and handling of in+ters+.ate commerce over, the lines of said
railroads and of tiransportation of persons and freight be-
tween and among the states; and from ordering, directing,
aiding, assisting, ol- abetting in any x manner whatever,
any person or persons to commit any or either of the acts
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aforesaid 7'
"The scope and Piurpo.-se of the bill was only to re-
strain forcible obstructions of the highways along which inu
terstate commerce travels and the mails are carried. And
the facts s t forth at length are only those which tencied to
show that the defendants were engaged in such obstructions"'
"An examination of the order shows that it consiststu
of two parts, though they are not separated. The first
portion envmerat es the,particular things which the defend-i.
ants may !:ot do, and those things av'e all in themselves un-
lawful and injurious. But, among then 1he persuading of
employes to quit the servicex of the r$Alroads is riot in-
cluded; the only ise of the word ersvade' is in the clause
forbidding *" defendants to induce employes in the service
of said rail-oads to refuse to perform their duties as em-
ployes of sait railroads engaged in interstate commerce, "or
the carriage of the United States mails. It does hot for-
bid them to use persuasion to induce employes to quit the
servic(,e.
"The second portion of the order, embracing the last
two clauses, frbids the doing of anylact - even though it
be lawful in itself- in furtherance of any conspiracy, or
combination to restrain either of the railroads from freely
controlling and handling interstate commerce, and also
forbids the ordering, directing, aiding or abetting any per-
son to commit any or either of the acts aforesaid"
-'t, The decissinn was based on the grounds (1) protection
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of the mails; (2) protection of interstate commerce, and (3)
to prevent a public nuisance. It is clea" from the au-
thorilies that the United States has a prop irty riht in the
mails -tnd this right should be protected from iireparable
injury. The duty to govern interstate commerce is given by
the constitution and +he jurisdiction of equity under the
interstate commerce act and the anti-trust law would se,im to
be undoubted. However the court did not rest its juris-
diction on the statutes but on the gcound "that the govern-
ment of the United States is one having jurisdiction over
every foot of soil within its territory, and acting directly
upon each citizen; that while it is a government of enumer-
ateci powers, it has within the limits of those powere all
the attributes of sovereignty; that to it is committed power
over interstate commerce and the transmission of the mailx;
thAt the power thus conferred upon the haticnnal gove-nment
are not dormant, but have been assumed and put into prac-
tical execcise by the legislation of Congress; that ink the
exerecise of those powers it is competent for the nation to
remove all obstructions upon highways, natu'al or artificial
to the passage of in+erstate commerce or the carrying of the
ma i ls '1.
On the third ground the court proceeded upon the thepi
that intersta4 ,e railways are highways and thatt the obstruc-
tion of the highwa, was a public nuisance and could be en-
joined. "A public nuisance is a violation of a public
right, eithbr by a direct encroachment ufon public rights
lo9.
or property, or by doing some act which tends to a common
injury, or by onitting to do some act which the common good
requi.es and which it is the duty of a perso, to do, and
the omission to do which results injuriously to the public.1
Wood on Uuisances (2 Ed.) 29. At page 259, he says, "Any
unreasonable obstruction of a highi'ay is a public nuisance"'
Applying these rules to the facts of the case it is evident
that 4here was a sufficient obstruction of a public highway
to constitute Ainuisnce.
Was the Debs case justified? It would seem to have
been clearly justified b,/ the authorities. If the acts of
the defendants in that case had not been restrained it
seems that nothing could be the result but disorder and
anarchy. -JI-.:our government is so weak, if it has not the
power to restrain such acts, it is certainly a weakness that
must prove fatal +o ifs stability. A government that
and thus protect its granted powers
cannot restrain and stop such acts of lawlessness"is certain
ly in danger of anarchy and the legitimate prey of the so-
cialist.
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There can be little adde.,d by way of conclusion. I
have carefully examined the cases bearing on the question
and my conclusion have been stateu at variois places in this
thesis. When I began studying the question I supposed from
the popular clamor raised agaiist it, that the Pebs case was
the first and only one where an injunction had been iused in
these troubles. But I find that the State courts have
been thus settling these coXtr9ersiVV in this State from
1875.) If confined within propcir limits, and applied to
all with an impartial hand, it is certainly a beneficient
use of judicial authority; but if the courts continue to
apply it in cases like the Oxley Stave Co. case and Barr v.
Essex Trades Couincil and refuse to apply it in cases like
the Continental Ins. Co. and the Mogul case, then it comes
far from being a proper use and is certainly a judicial
discrimination against the masses in favor of the classes.
Properly used it is not only justifiable, but it is a good
thing for the public benefit.
Pomeroy says, "that the common law theory of not in-
terfering with persons until they shall have actually com-
mitted a wrong, is fundamentally erroneous; and that a rem-
edy which prevents a threatened wrong is in its essential
nature better than x a remedy which permits the wrong to
the
be done, and attempts to pay for it by"pecuniary damages
which a jury may assess. The ideal remedy in an,; perfect
system of administering justice would be that which abso-
141.
lutely precludes the commission of a wrong, not that which
awards punishment or satisfaction for a wrong after it is
committed' It seems to that Pomeroy is right whenever such




The earliest American case I have been able to find where
the injunction was used in labor troubles is Muller v. Grantz.
It is unreported and is simply mentioned in Vol. 2, Cent. L. J.,
308. I wrote to the attorneys in the case and received the
following replies:-
New York, February,12,98
H. M. Merrihew, Esq.,
Cook place, Ithaca, N. Y.
My Dear Sir:
2n answer to your note of the 16th, I beg to say
that according to my best recollection, no opinion was written by
Judge Barrett in the case you refer to. It was ah application by
Mr. Mueller, who was a manufacturer of clothing, to restrain his
workmen who were on a strike, from interfering with other employss
I appeared -or the defendant and opposed the motion. Judge
Barrett denied the application for an injunction on the spot, and
therefore wrote no opinion, expressing his views orally. From
my recollection , I can give no further information, and as the
papers have all been stowed away among the dead wood of the offi,
it would take a long time to resurrect them.





New York, feb. 17th, 1898.
H. M. Merrihew, Esq.,
1 Cook PLace, Ithaca, N. Y.
Dear Sir:-
Yours of the 16th inst. at hand and contents noted.
I enclose a copy of my register in the case referred to. All
the papers are on file in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme
Court.
It was an aptempt to put down a strike in equity, upon the
theory that such a combination was unlawful as a combination in
restraint of trade, and -here was ho remedy at law. It was
successfuil then because the trade unions had not invoked the aid
of politics to help them, and they were not so adroit then with
boycotts and relied more upon threats and intimidati-on.




Supreme Court. Action for Relief, Injunction.
Dam. $5000.
Augustus F. M uller,
against
Henry Ggantz, William Grantz, Eckhardt
Schade, George Debes, John Leipple,
Christoph Landahl, rank Rezae, Fred-
erick W. Pich, Franz Adamek, John Scheick,
Frederick Kupper,,John Simansky,
Conrad Diederick, Gustav Hoffman, John
Grede, William Wollf, A. Becker, John
P. Gatterden, Hanschild, Henry
Kring, John Weisheimer & John George Ebel.
1875.
Mch. 31 Complaint sworn to by plaintiff.
Apr. 2d Filed undertaking on injunction and obtained order of
injunction. Donohue J.
a Served summons and complaint on John Grede and William
Wollf also affts. on injunction and order of injunc-
tion on same at 441 Sixth St. and order of injunction
on William Hector and George Debes on 14th St. near
Broadway, Service George Gordon.
" 8 Filed affidavits and summons and complaint in Co.
Clks. office.
" 14 Filed note of issue.
" 20 "Recd. notice of appearence of all defendants. Runbull
& Englehardt, 320 Broadway.
" 2B Case on Cal. at Chambers No. 108 set down for Friday
for argument.
" 21 Consented that all defendants have ten days from date
within which to serve their answers.
May 1st. Gave defts. 10th days further time to answer.
Apr. 23 argued motion, decision reserved.
May 5, Order of injunction modified & limited to threats &c.
" 5 Recd. notice of Runkell & Englehardt removal to
Tribune Building Rooms 45 to 48.
" " Received proposed order for settlement on the 7th inst
7 1 Proposed orders submitted by both sides for settlement
" 10 Order as submitted by Plff settled.
11 Recd. copy answer. Admr.
" 12 Served copy of injunction on Atty. ETC.
" 24 Served notice of trial on attys. for June 1871 adme.
" 27 Recd. cross "
" 29 Filed note of issue. Pd $3.00
June 11 On Cal. Marked off Term.
July 13 Obtained order to show cause why Frederick W. Pich
should not be committed for contempt returnable the
19th of July, 18752 Opening of the Court.
" 13 Served Frederick W.Pich on 141h between University PL
& B'way with order to show cause and affts. Etc.
2 19 Mgtion for contempt adjd. to July 22 at 12 M.
22 " " July 29 2 2
2 29 " " " August 5th at 12 M.
Aug. 5 " " 0 " "
" 10 Motion argued. Order of reference entered and Sinclame
appointed Referee totake evidence. Interrogatories to
be served within twenty days.
12 Served copy order on atty. Admr.
Aug. 30 Time to serve and file interrogatories extended to
Sept. 9, 1875 by consent.
Sept. 8th, Time to serve and file interrogatories extended 20
days or to Sept..28, 1875 by consent.
" 28 Consented that the time be extended L10 days in addi-
tion to file interrogatories.
1876
Jan. 5 Case on Calendar, marked off term.
1877
Jan. 5 " " " f "
Ithen wro'e to Mr. Field asking if he would have one of
his clerks make me copies of the injunction order and opinion.
I received the following reply from Mr. Trabold:-
New York, Feby. 24th, 1898.
Mr. H. Merton Merrihew?
i Cook PLace, Ithaca, N Y.
Dear Sir:-
Herewith I enclose you a copy of the order in the cae.
of Muller against Grantz as per your request in your Letter to
Mr. Field. As there has been no opinion filed in this case a
copy cannot be obtained.
I also enclose you my bill for $1.00.
Yours &c.,
Henry Trabold.
Order of Judge Donohue.




Henry Grantz, william Grahtz and others.
------------------------------ x- e
On reading the cpmplaint inthis action duly verified, also
V,
the affidavits of Augustus F. Muller, David Reis, Ludwig Meffrt,
and Charles Croissant, it is ordered that the defendants (naming
them) and their and aach of their attorneys, counsellors, agents,
assistants and associates and each and every of them under the
penalties by law prescribed and each and every of them do abso-
lutely desist and refrain from interfering with the employment of
workmen by Augustus F. Muller by stoppbng workmen at and about t1
entrance of the place of business of the plaintiff No. 42 East
14th Street, and inducing them to persuasions and threats not to
enter his employment or otherwise, and from interfering with his
workmen in returning to their respective homes with materials
to be made up, by following them on the way, on inducing them by
persuasions and threats to return material received by them with-
out making up the same or by payments of money causing such
workmen to deliver the material to themto return the same or alk
otherwise, and from interfering with his workmen at their a4
4.44- respective homes by calling on them and inducing them by
persuasions and threats to return the material received by them
without making up the same or by payments of money causing such
workmen to deliver the material to them, to return the same or by
causing others to call upon them to accomplish such results, and
from interfering with his workmen in returning to his Place of
business, No. 42 Ea st 14th Street, and in being re-employed by
him Augustus F/Muller, by stopping such workmen on the way or
inducung them by persuasions and threats to return :n their work
and refuse to be re-employed or'otherwise and from interfering wt
with the business of Augustus F. Muller in any manner or form
whatever.
vi/
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants show cause be-
fore this eourt at a Special Term thereof, to be held at Ckambers
thereof on the third day of April, at 12 o'clock noon, or as soon
thereafter as counsel can be heard, why this order should not be
continued in force until the fuirther order of the Court in the





At a Special Term of the Svpreme
Court held at the Chambers thereof at
the County Court House in the City of
New York on the 10th day of May, 1875.
Present,




Henry grantz, William Grantz, & ors.
Defendants.
On reading and 'iling the complaint herein and the affi-
davits of the plaintiff, David Reis, Ludwig Meffert and Charles
Croissant and the injunction order granted herein on the 2nd day
of April, 1875, and the order to show cause why the same should
not be continued on the part of theplaintiff, and the answer and
affidavits of all the defendants, and after hearing Widliam
Hildreth Field of Counsel for Plaintiff in favor of said motion,
and A. J. Dittenhoeffer and C. A. Runkle in opposition,
ORDERED that the injunction muJst be confined to intimida-
vii/
tions and that the defendants (naming them) and their and aach
of their attorneys, counsellors, agents, assistants, and associat
and each and every of them under the penalties of law prescribeJ,
do absolutely desist and refrain from acts of intimidations to-
wards workmen seeking employment from Augi;st's F. Muller to in-
duce them riot to enter his employmaxt, and from any acts of in-
timidations towards workmen in his employ to induce them not to
perform the services agreed to be performed by them respectively
or not to continue in such employ, or not to be re-employed by
Augustus F. Muller, and from caiseing others to use or employ





There is one other strike case (Moorhead V. Krause) of
which I have been able to obtain no record or report. The case
is mentioned in 11urdock V. Walker, 152 Pa. St., 595.
Ihave found but one boycott case mentioned that is'nt re-
ported. It is mentioned in 14 N. J. L. J. 162, where it is
stated that a. full report of the case was printed in the Sacra-
mento Bee of Nov. 20, 1390. I tried to get a copy of that issue
but was uhable to do so. The following letters give the only
history of the caseI have been able to obtain and also explain
my inability to get copies of the report.
Sacramento, Cal.? March 2/98.
Mr. H. M. Merrihue,
1 Cook PLace, Ithaca,N.Y.
Dear Siv:
viii.
Referring to your favor of Feby. 7th, asking if we could
supply copies of the issue of NOv. 20th, 1890, of THE BEEcontain-
a full report of THE BEE boycott case, and the now celebrated
decision of Judge Armstrong. We have been unable to obtain any
copy of this date for you. You will not find it in the Cali-
fornis reports, since it was a decision by Judge Armstrong of the
Superior Court of this Couhty, which would undoubtedly have been
affirmed, but the strikers refused to permit it to go to the
Supreme Court. The title of the case was C. K. McClatchy et al
vs G. W. McKay et al.
A typewrttten copy of the matter might be made fo1 your
use, but the expense perhaps would be too large, under the cir-
cumstances.
Briefly, the occasion of the suit was the fact that the
united tradex unions of 4-he Ct~y had organized a boycott against
THE BEE because it refused to reinstate a certain discharged em-
ploye, discharged for incompetehcy, and they were threatening
trades people that, if they did not withdraw their advertisements
from THE BEE, and the subscribers that if they did not cease to
subscribe for it, that they would be punished by loss of trade,
and in otherx ways. Our suit was in the nature of an injunction
against 17,0 or 200 named leade-s cir .he various trade unions in
this City, who were prominent in the boycott proceedings. The
and
injunction was obtained &gaxxt the leaders were fined for con-
tempt of Court, Judge Armstrong rendering the decision referred&
Respectfully yours,
Janes McClatchy & Co.
ix/
Sacramento, Cal. Mar. 8, 1898.
Mr. H. M. Merrihew,
# 1 Cook Place, Ithaca, N1 Y.
Dear Sir:- You cannot get a copy of a Bee thit yoiu mention. The
only way that yoii would be able to get that is by having a copy




Sacramento, Cal. March 15/ 98.
Mr. H. M. Merrihue,
Ithaca, N. Y.
Dear Sir:
Ihave your favor of March th, addressed to James
McClatchy & Co., in reference to a copy of the Armstrong decision
which has been referred to me for answer. the decision is a
long one, and being bound in book form, as the file of papers is,
it will be very dificult for one to copy. I will do the wore,
compare copy and make two carbons, if you desire, for $10. Of
course I am only estimating about how much work there is to do,
and if it whould fall short off ri estiamte, T -viii 'eb e you
accordingly. If you desire the work dore at 1tgr&xbzxx
that figure, and wire , as you suggested in your letter, address
me personally, as by so doing it will save some time.
Jessie Davis?
Stenographer, THE BEE.
In 1 Ry & CORp. L. J.7112, it is stated that an applica-
tion for an injunction was made by one McFadden against the
Compagnie Generale Translantique , Ihave been able to find no
other record of the case.
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